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The precise jurisdictions and fields of operation for Congress and the 
President will always elude us. 
—Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the 
President1  
I. Introduction 
The murky demarcations between congressional and presidential 
authority instigate many heavyweight bouts over the bounds of legislative 
and executive power.2  The struggle for dominance between Congress and 
the President has produced yet another herculean clash.3  The issue 
confronted by this Note is whether Congress violates the separation of 
powers doctrine4  by retaining virtually all control, except for the removal 
1. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 291 (5th ed., rev. 2007). 
2. See id. at 12 ("[T]he imbalance between President and Congress is chronic and 
permanent."); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers 
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1128–29 (2000) ("[W]e cannot seem to solve the problem of 
separation of powers. We are not even close. We do not agree on what the principle 
requires, what its objectives are, or how it does or could accomplish its objectives."). 
3. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: 
THE ROLES OF INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, INSPECTORS GENERAL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 1 (1998), available at http://web1.millercenter.org/commissions/comm 
_1998.pdf ("Many gray areas remain . . . where the delineation of powers is not so clear and 
where, in fact, the branches of government, usually the legislative and executive, grapple 
from time to time for dominance."). For an examination of the history behind the struggle 
for power between Congress and the President, see generally FISHER, supra note 1. 
4. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 14 
(Liberty Fund, Inc., 2d ed. 1998) (1967) (defining succinctly the "pure doctrine" of the 
separation of powers). Vile defines the separation of powers doctrine as follows: 
It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the 
government be divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the 
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power, over the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (SIGTARP),5  a government watchdog commissioned to supervise 
the Treasury Department’s execution of Congress’s monumental economic 
bailout program,6  and by requiring Treasury, an executive branch agency, to 
implement recommendations from SIGTARP that are either necessary or 
appropriate. 
Congress’s passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 (EESA)7  created an unprecedented8  $700 billion governmental bailout 
scheme—the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).9  Congress designated 
SIGTARP the overseer of this bailout program, allocating to SIGTARP the 
authority to recommend to Treasury certain actions with respect to Treasury’s 
management of TARP funds.10  In an amendment to EESA, Congress 
mandated that the executive branch must either act on these 
executive, and the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a 
corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative, executive, or 
judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the exercise of its 
own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other 
branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of 
government must be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to 
be at the same time a member of more than one branch. In this way each of the 
branches will be a check to the others and no single group of people will be able 
to control the machinery of the State. 
Id.; see also 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 313 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
Liberty Fund, Inc. 1987) ("[S]eparation [of powers] entails a clear discrimination of powers, 
an independence whereby each power conducts its deliberations free of external influence, 
and a dependence whereby the actions of each are subject to scrutiny and control by the 
others."); infra Part V.A (surveying the Founders’ intent behind the separation of powers 
principle). 
5. See infra notes 40–52 and accompanying text (offering an overview of SIGTARP). 
6. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465 (2009) (stating that the federal 
government’s decision to enact the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
"mark[ed] the largest government economic intervention in history"). 
7. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2006) 
[hereinafter EESA] (establishing TARP). 
8. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 465 ("[T]he government decided, in the 
course of less than a month, to create through congressional action an unprecedented $700 
billion asset purchase program."); see also 155 CONG. REC. H3,848 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) 
(statement of Rep. Dennis Moore) (referring to EESA and stating that "[w]e stand on the 
precipice of the largest infusion of government funds over the shortest period of time in our 
Nation’s history" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
9. See EESA § 5211 (establishing TARP). 
10. See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing SIGTARP’s statutory 
authority to supervise Treasury’s execution of TARP and to make recommendations to 
Treasury with respect to TARP). 
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recommendations or, in the event that the executive declines to act, explain to 
Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate.11  The issue presented by 
this provision is whether Congress usurps the executive’s prerogative to 
control the execution of the laws, and thereby violates the separation of 
powers tenet, by obliging Treasury to follow necessary or appropriate 
recommendations from SIGTARP, over whom Congress has retained 
significant control.12  Analysis of this issue requires an understanding of the 
economic context in which EESA and its amendment were adopted.13 
The crisis that led to Congress’s enactment of EESA has been called the 
worst economic calamity since the Great Depression.14  This "Great 
Recession,"15  as one economist calls it, has triggered the failure of major 
businesses,16  a $14 trillion decline in consumer wealth,17  the largest job-loss 
11. See Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121, 123 Stat. 1603, 1604 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5231(f)) [hereinafter SIGTARP Act] (requiring that the Treasury Secretary must "certify" 
to Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate when the Secretary elects not to heed 
SIGTARP’s recommendations). 
12. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) ("The dangers of congressional 
usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized."). 
13. See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6. Davidoff and Zaring "evaluate the 
government’s response to the crisis through a blow-by-blow, or historical, account." Id. at 
470. 
14. See Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great 
Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Three Top Economists] ("Nouriel Roubini, professor of 
economics and international business at New York University, Kenneth Rogoff, professor of 
economics and public policy at Harvard University, and Nariman Behravesh, chief 
economist and executive vice president for HIS Global Insight, all agreed that this is the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.") (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Rogoff described the current financial crisis as "a once in a 50-year event." 
Id.; see also Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the 
President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/ 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (referring to the current market catastrophe as "a historic 
economic crisis") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
15. See Three Top Economists, supra note 14 (observing that Behravesh dubbed the 
crisis the "Great Recession"). 
16. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG 
Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB  
122145492097035549.html (observing that the "American financial system was shaken to its 
core" by the failure of prominent U.S. businesses such as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Bear Stearns Cos., Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
17. See MARTIN NEIL BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, INITIATIVE ON BUS. & PUB. 
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episode since the World War II era,18  and historic collapses in the banking, 
credit, and housing markets.19  The federal government responded to this 
market catastrophe by forcing the sale of prominent businesses and by 
seizing the reins of other renowned companies that had buckled under the 
pressure of this economic landslide.20 	After this unprecedented 
POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE US FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND 
AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 7 (2009), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_econ 
omic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf ("Households lost $13 trillion of wealth from the peak through 
the end of 2008 . . . [and lost] another $1.33 trillion . . . in the first quarter of 2009 . . . ."). 
18. See Timothy R. Homan, Job Losses in U.S. Slow as Unemployment Climbs to 
26-Year High, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aVmZJLQoKv2g (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("The latest numbers 
brought total jobs lost since the recession began in December 2007 to 6.9 million, the 
biggest decline in any post-World War II economic slump.") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The 9.7% unemployment rate, as of July 2009, is the highest in 
twenty-six years. Id. 
19. See BAILY & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 5–7 ("Declines in the real economy 
exacerbated the problems of financial institutions, which then created a credit crunch 
hurting the real economy . . . . [T]here was a decline [in home-construction] of over 38 
percent in the first quarter of 2009 at an annual rate."). 
20. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches 
to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 56–72 (2009) (examining the federal government’s 
extraordinary "on-the-fly" response to the 2008 market crisis); Steven Pearse, Note, 
Accounting for the Lack of Accountability: The Great Depression Meets the Great 
Recession, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 409, 421 (2010) ("To prevent a complete collapse of 
all of these financial institutions and avoid a total breakdown of the American economy, 
the Executive Branch took quick and decisive action to bail these companies out of their 
self-inflicted financial crisis." (footnote omitted)); see also Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 
6, at 466 ("As the crisis developed, the government forced the sales of one of the five 
largest investment banks, the largest thrift in the country, and a number of consumer 
banks." (footnote omitted)). "[The government] permitted an even larger investment bank 
and another of the country’s largest thrifts to fail." Id. "The government also took over 
the country’s largest insurer and nationalized . . . two government-sponsored enterprises 
that mortally suffered from the popping of the housing bubble." Id. 
According to Davidoff and Zaring, the "first hints of public trouble in the credit 
markets began to emerge from the subprime mortgage market in April 2007." Id. at 
471. The federal government’s unprecedented involvement as a facilitator of private 
deals began with the downfall of Bear Stearns in May 2008. See id. at 473–77 
(detailing the series of events that preceded Bear’s collapse); Charles K. Whitehead, 
Reframing Financial Regulation 22–23 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 09-026, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447424 (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2011) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Immediately before Bear would have been forced to declare bankruptcy, the 
government pressured JPMorgan into acquiring Bear Stearns and squeezed J.C. 
Flowers, another of Bear’s suitors, out of the deal. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 
6, at 479–80 ("Treasury pushed JPMorgan to offer as low a price as possible for 
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governmental involvement failed to stave off further financial devastation, 
the government abandoned its previous plan and adopted a new strategy— 
massive "emergency legislation."21  And out of this emergency legislation 
was born EESA and, with it, a dramatic expansion of governmental 
power.22 
As the smoke clears from this display of government action, it 
becomes evident that EESA was enacted with "all the hallmarks of 
emergency."23  When government reacts hurriedly to a monumental crisis,24 
Bear . . . . The chastened investment bank took the deal." (footnotes omitted)). 
In July 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision seized IndyMac Bank, resulting in the 
second-largest bank failure in U.S. history. Id. at 485. Congress then passed the Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 12 U.S.C. § 4501, providing "$300 billion in 
aid to subprime housing buyers." Id. at 484–85. After nationalizing Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in September 2008, id. at 486, the government watched as Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy and as Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America. Id. at 493–94. 
The Federal Reserve then nationalized American International Group (AIG), committing 
$182.5 billion to the bailout scheme. Id. at 499; see Whitehead, supra, at 23, 30–36 
(recounting AIG’s financial downfall and the federal government’s subsequent takeover of 
the company). The FDIC then seized the assets of Washington Mutual and sold them to 
JPMorgan without informing the leadership of Washington Mutual. Davidoff & Zaring, 
supra note 6, at 508. Wachovia was the next target of the FDIC, which facilitated the sale of 
the company to Wells Fargo. Id. at 509. The final "pre-EESA episode of government as 
dealmaker" transpired in October 2008, when the government facilitated the rescue of 
Morgan Stanley. Id. at 511–12. 
21. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 464–65 ("When the real estate bubble 
popped, with catastrophic implications for the financial institutions that facilitated property 
purchases, the credit market, and, eventually, all of the participants in the worldwide 
financial system, the federal government reacted slowly, and then uncertainly, and finally on 
an emergency and massive basis."); id. at 512–13 ("Clearly, the government’s ad hoc 
strategy was failing and a greater response was needed . . . . The result was a turn away 
from the deal-to-deal approach and toward Congress."). 
22. See id. at 523 ("The bailout statute represented a dramatic expansion of the 
government powers to enter the financial markets, but it also represented a massive grant of 
flexibility to the Treasury Department, accompanied by hundreds of billions of authorized 
dollars. That the authorization was unprecedented is perhaps obvious."). 
23. See id. at 513 ("The text of the first draft of the bailout bill submitted to Congress 
came from the Treasury Department on September 20, [2008,] with all the hallmarks of 
emergency; there has never been a shorter draft statute that would have committed such a 
large amount of money."). The initial draft of EESA "did not provide for judicial review of 
anything [the Treasury] Department did." Id. at 515. Congress rejected this initial draft on 
September 29. Id. at 518. However, in the wake of EESA’s initial defeat, the stock market 
continued to fold. Id. Spurred by the increasingly fierce economic crisis, Congress altered 
and expanded the bill and "quickly passed the amended statute on October 4." Id. The 
bailout bill "had grown from 3 pages in length to 451 pages in length in less than two 
weeks." Id. 
24. See id. at 475 ("The government’s actions [during this economic crisis] were 
reactive rather than proactive."). 
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a fair inquiry is whether its action is faithful to constitutional norms, or 
whether some vital principle falls by the wayside and is sacrificed to 
apparent necessity.25  
26 Here, the forgotten principle is the separation of powers doctrine. 
Because the Founding Fathers viewed the separation of powers as the 
keystone of sound government,27  this principle has been upheld even when 
both the executive and the legislative branches have ignored it in the name 
of expediency.28  This Note analyzes whether the separation of powers 
25. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 24 (2004) ("The 
legislature tends to be nondeliberative."). "The major disadvantage of the legislative branch 
is that, despite the oath requirement of the U.S. Constitution, . . . legislators have strong 
incentives to ignore constitutional requirements that are not popular." Id. "The legislature’s 
ability to shift quickly can lead to inconsistency and uncertainty . . . ." Id. 
26. See supra note 4 (defining the separation of powers principle); infra Part V.A 
(discussing the underpinnings of the separation of powers and explaining the critical 
importance of preserving this principle). 
27. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) (recognizing "the importance 
of the doctrine of separation of powers which is at the heart of our Constitution"); 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The fundamental necessity of 
maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the 
control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been 
stressed and is hardly open to serious question."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 336 (James 
Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1961) 
("No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of 
more enlightened patrons of liberty, than [the separation of powers principle]. The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); see also ANDREW M. ALLISON ET AL., 
THE REAL THOMAS JEFFERSON 622 (2d ed., rev. 1983) (quoting Thomas Jefferson as stating 
that the "first principle of a good government is, certainly, a distribution of its powers into 
executive, judiciary, and legislative, and a subdivision of the latter into two or three 
branches" (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 454 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1898))). 
28. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) 
("[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating 
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution."). In Chadha, the Court invalidated a statute’s one-House congressional veto 
provision as violative of the separation of powers principle. Id. at 959. The one-House 
legislative veto contravened both the constitutional requirement that all legislative action 
must traverse both Houses of Congress (the bicameralism principle) and the constitutional 
requirement that all legislation must be presented to the President before becoming law (the 
Presentment Clauses). Id. at 945–59. Both the executive and the legislative branches 
acquiesced to this legislative veto for efficiency and expediency reasons. See Louis Fisher, 
Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: 
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 147 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. 
Rabkin eds., 1989) (observing that the legislative veto arose as a mutually beneficial pact 
between the executive and legislative branches, "a simple quid pro quo that allowed the 
executive branch to make law without any legislative action but gave Congress the right to 
recapture control without having to pass another public law"). In Chadha, the Court noted 
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principle has survived the government’s rush to address the economic 
downturn.29 
However, the implications of this Note reach beyond EESA, its 
amendment, and SIGTARP. Experts portend more uncertainty in the 
market, the possibility of future crises,30  and the likelihood of more 
emergency legislation.31  Just as Congress resorted to "novel efforts" by 
enacting EESA and its amendment,32  future problems may produce 
that, from 1932 until the Court’s 1983 decision in Chadha, 295 similar congressional veto 
procedures had been enacted by statutes. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. However, the Court 
found that neither the frequency of nor the convenience offered by these congressional veto 
provisions justified undercutting the separation of powers principle. Id. at 944–45. The 
Court stated: 
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks-  
of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by 
the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing 
frequency in statutes . . . . 
Justice White undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one- 
House veto is a useful "political invention," and we need not challenge that 
assertion . . . . 	But policy arguments supporting even useful "political 
inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers 
and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be 
exercised. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
29. See Pearse, supra note 20, at 411 (contending that, although the federal 
government’s massive bailout program granted "quick relief" to the American people, the 
"Constitution has seemingly been undermined" in the process). 
30. See BAILY & ELLIOTT, supra note 17, at 2–3 ("We fear that the . . . reactions of the 
financial markets and . . . analysts carry too much . . . optimism without recognizing enough 
of the uncertainty . . . . [T]here is still [much] uncertainty about when the recession will end, 
when growth will recover or whether the financial sector is firmly on the road to recovery."). 
"Uncertainty about Congressional authorization of additional funds could create panic in the 
markets and exacerbate a future stage of crisis." Id. at 23. 
31. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 532 (outlining the pattern of governmental 
response to crises). Davidoff and Zaring state: 
Government responses to crises have their own pattern . . . . The response often 
begins with the scramble of governments to keep up with fast-paced and 
deleterious market events, leading to an initial, ad hoc phase in government 
action, where emergencies are responded to with emergency-style rules and 
emergency-style process. In sufficiently serious crises, the next phase may be a 
legislative one—beginning with outraged congressional hearings and then new 
legislative authority . . . . Finally, there is reform; either reform forgone in favor 
of blue-ribbon commissions and minor regulatory reorganization, or reform 
embraced by new legislation and a restructuring of the financial regulatory 
system. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
32. See id. at 466 (discussing the government’s "novel efforts during [this] financial 
crisis"). 
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additional legislative experimentation.33  If the separation of powers 
principle is diluted in the current economic emergency,34  its future utility is 
questionable.35  Hence, because this Note contemplates the likelihood of 
more bold moves by Congress in response to future emergencies, this Note 
not only proposes a solution to the SIGTARP separation of powers issue, 
but also recommends a time-honored principle for repelling separation of 
powers attacks that may plague future crisis legislation. 
With that backdrop in mind, Part II of this Note sets forth the relevant 
facts underlying the separation of powers issue raised by EESA, its 
amendment, and SIGTARP. Part III surveys Supreme Court precedent on 
the portion of the separation of powers principle relevant to this Note and 
applies this precedent to the issue presented by SIGTARP, arguing that the 
separation of powers has been transgressed. 
Part IV proposes a workable solution to the SIGTARP separation of 
powers predicament in the form of an amendment to the problematic 
statute. In addition to proffering a solution to SIGTARP’s separation of 
powers problem, this Note submits a standard for resolving similar 
separation of powers issues that may arise as a result of America’s 
uncertain future. As America weathers the current economic storm, it 
enters uncharted territory—even experts are uncertain about what lies 
33. See id. at 470 (finding that the "gathering crisis pushed the government" to 
abandon its initial approach and to adopt more drastic measures in an attempt to rectify the 
economy). 
34. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (striking down as violative of the 
separation of powers principle a statute through which Congress retained removal power 
over a congressional officer who exercised executive power). Confronted by "fiscal and 
economic problems of unprecedented magnitude," Congress enacted the statute at issue in 
Bowsher for the purpose of eliminating the federal budget deficit. Id. at 717, 736. However, 
the Court found that the economic crisis did not justify violating the separation of powers 
doctrine. Id. at 736. The Court stated: 
No one can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted with fiscal and 
economic problems of unprecedented magnitude, but "the fact that a given law 
or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. 
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks-  
of democratic government . . . ." 
Id. (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
35. See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2008, at A19 (reporting that Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s current chief of staff, 
stated in an interview: "Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste . . . . They are 
opportunities to do big things"). Crises are often utilized as breeding grounds for long-
awaited changes. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 484 ("[T]he government used the 
crisis to push for some long-cherished reform of the financial regulatory system."). 
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ahead. However, as mentioned above, more crises and, thus, more bold, 
sweeping legislative responses, are likely. To ensure that the separation of 
powers withstands these governmental responses to future emergencies, the 
often shifting Supreme Court precedent must not serve as the lone defense 
against the deterioration of the separation of powers. Instead, the American 
people must arise and reclaim their station as the guardians of the republic. 
Part V petitions for the resurgence of this principle, explaining that the 
Founders intended for the people to fulfill this critical role. Accordingly, 
America must turn to the people to safeguard the separation of powers 
during the uncertain times ahead. 
II. The Relevant Facts Underlying the Separation of Powers Issue 
Presented by SIGTARP 
Congress enacted EESA in an attempt to resurrect the economy.36  The 
centerpiece of EESA is TARP, which authorizes the Treasury Secretary to 
purchase "troubled assets" such as residential and commercial mortgages, 
related securities, and other difficult-to-sell resources.37  Although Congress 
allocated only $700 billion for the purchase of troubled assets through 
TARP,38  the total amount of federal funds expended in connection with 
TARP could exceed $23 trillion.39 
36. See EESA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, pmbl., 122 Stat. 3765, 3765 (2008) ("An Act [t]o 
provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of 
troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the 
economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers . . . ."). 
37. See EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1) (2006) ("The Secretary is authorized to 
establish . . . TARP . . . to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, 
troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms . . . as are determined by the 
Secretary, and in accordance with this chapter and the policies and procedures developed 
and published by the Secretary."); id. § 5202(9)(A)–(B) (defining "troubled assets" as 
"residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments 
that are based on or related to such mortgages . . . [and] any other financial instrument that 
the Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market 
stability . . . ."); see also Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP 4–5 (Boston 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-31, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436462 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011) (offering a brief overview of EESA and TARP) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); id. at 6 (noting that, through EESA, Congress effectively 
"empower[ed] the national government to become a gargantuan mortgage broker"). 
38. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (Oct. 21, 2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP 
QUARTERLY REPORT], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October 
2009_Quarterly_Report_to_ Congress.pdf. 
39. In a statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
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A. Overview of TARP and SIGTARP 
To ensure accountability for the use of TARP funds, Congress 
established, through EESA, the Office of the Special Inspector General for 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program.40  SIGTARP is appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate and is removable from office by the 
President.41  Neil M. Barofsky42  was confirmed by the Senate to the 
position of SIGTARP on December 8, 2008, and was sworn into office on 
December 15, 2008.43  SIGTARP enjoys a $65 million operating budget.44 
SIGTARP’s mission is to "advance economic stability by promoting 
the efficiency and effectiveness of TARP management, through 
transparency, through coordinated oversight, and through robust 
on July 21, 2009, SIGTARP explained that, since the conception of TARP, the Treasury 
Department has "created 12 separate programs involving Government and private funds of 
up to almost $3 trillion." Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector Gen., Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, Statement Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2 
(July 21, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/testimony/2009/Testimony 
_Before_the_House_Committee_on_Oversight_and_Government_Reform.pdf. However, 
SIGTARP acknowledged that, "[a]s massive and as important as TARP is on its own, it is 
just one part of a much broader Federal Government effort to stabilize and support the 
financial system." Id. SIGTARP acknowledged that the "total potential Federal 
Government support could reach up to $23.7 trillion." Id. 
40. EESA § 5231; see also James C. Dugan & Scott S. Rose, TARP Enforcement: 
Latest Developments and Insights, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, June 30, 
2009, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&EntryNo=9881 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("Recognizing that such a large pool of funds is subject to potential 
misuse, abuse, and fraud, Congress established [SIGTARP] as the chief enforcement body 
overseeing TARP.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
41. EESA § 5231(b)(1), (4); see also Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 
§ 3(b) [hereinafter IG Act] ("An Inspector General may be removed from office by the 
President. . . . [T]he President shall communicate . . . the reasons for any such removal . . . 
to both Houses of Congress."). 
42. Prior to his appointment as SIGTARP, Barofsky served as a federal prosecutor in 
the Southern District of New York for more than eight years. About Us—The Special 
Inspector General, http://www.sigtarp.gov/about_ig.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). During his tenure as a prosecutor, Barofsky 
was a Senior Trial Counsel who chaired the Mortgage Fraud Group. Id. In addition to 
prosecuting white collar crimes with the Securities and Commodities Fraud Unit, Barofsky 
spearheaded the drug investigation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which 
has been dubbed "the largest narcotics indictment filed in U.S. history." Id. Barofsky 
graduated magna cum laude from New York University School of Law. Id. 
43. Id. EESA provides that SIGTARP’s limited existence is coterminous with the 
existence of TARP. EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5231(k). 
44. Public-Private Investment Program Improvement and Oversight Act of 2009, 12 
U.S.C. § 5231a(c)(1) (increasing SIGTARP’s operating budget from $50 million to $65 
million). 
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enforcement against those, whether inside or outside of government, who 
waste, steal or abuse TARP funds."45  SIGTARP’s primary duties46  include 
auditing Treasury’s management of TARP,47  making recommendations to 
Treasury with respect to TARP funds and activities,48  investigating 
allegations of fraud or abuse with respect to TARP funds,49  preparing 
45. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at title page. 
46. In addition to the duties specifically enumerated in EESA, Congress endowed 
SIGTARP with the "duties and responsibilities of inspectors general" under the IG Act. 
EESA § 5231(c)(3). It is not clear whether this provision of authority in EESA endows 
SIGTARP with every duty and responsibility that is delineated in the IG Act or whether the 
EESA provision is limited to § 4 of the IG Act, entitled "Duties and Responsibilities." 
VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 
(SIG) FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP) 4 (2009), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40099.pdf.  
Section 4(a)(1) of the IG Act, which grants auditing authority, is likely not applicable to 
SIGTARP because EESA contains language that grants SIGTARP’s specific auditing 
authority. Compare IG Act § 4(a)(1) (delineating that it is the duty of each IG "to provide 
policy direction for and to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations 
relating to the programs and operations of such establishment"), with EESA § 5231(c)(1) ("It 
shall be the duty of [SIGTARP] to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and 
investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the 
Treasury under any program established by the Secretary . . . , and the management by the 
Secretary of any program established under [EESA] . . . ."). See also BURROWS, supra, at 4 
("Depending on how [EESA] is interpreted, it is possible that [SIGTARP’s] responsibilities 
will not encompass § 4(a)(1) of the IG Act . . . ."). "Since the provisions creating 
[SIGTARP] contain specific language with regard to conducting, supervising, and 
coordinating audits and investigations, and this specific language does not mention ‘policy 
direction,’ this provision of the IG Act would not seem to be included in the duties 
mentioned in [§ 5231(c)(3) of EESA]." Id. 
However, resolving the confusion regarding the specific extent of SIGTARP’s duties is 
not the purpose of this Note. 
47. See EESA § 5231(c)(1) ("It shall be the duty of [SIGTARP] to conduct, supervise, 
and coordinate audits and investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets by 
the Secretary of the Treasury under [any TARP] . . . , and the management by the Secretary 
of [any TARP] . . . ."). SIGTARP is to execute these audits and investigations partly by 
collecting and summarizing certain information, including information relating to the 
troubled assets purchased by the Secretary through TARP, the reasons for these purchases, 
the institutions from which the assets were purchased, the individuals hired to manage these 
TARP assets, and the total amount of troubled assets procured by Treasury through TARP. 
Id. § 5231(c)(1)(A)–(G). 
48. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(2)–(3) (providing that an IG possesses the duty 
to "review . . . legislation and regulations relating to . . . such establishment and to make 
[related] recommendations . . . [and] to recommend policies for . . . [the] activities [of] such 
establishment" in order to promote economy and efficiency and in order to prevent and to 
detect fraud or abuse). 
49. See id. § 4(a)(3) (providing that an IG possesses the power to "conduct, supervise, 
or coordinate . . . activities carried out or financed by such establishment for the purpose 
of . . . preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in . . . its programs and operations"). 
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quarterly reports for Congress on the TARP activities of both SIGTARP 
and Treasury,50  and keeping Congress "fully and currently informed" on 
SIGTARP’s activities.51  
In the exercise of these statutory duties, SIGTARP enjoys the authority 
conferred upon all other inspectors general (IG), including the power to 
access all TARP-related records available to Treasury, conduct 
investigations, request information and assistance from any federal or state 
governmental agency, subpoena information and data, and have direct 
access to the Treasury Secretary.52 
B. The Clash Between SIGTARP and Treasury Regarding Treasury’s 
Supervisory Authority over SIGTARP 
Congress has created IGs in many executive and legislative agencies53  
and has also created three special IGs: the Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
50. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 5(1), § 121. 
51. See IG Act § 4(a)(5) (providing that an IG has the responsibility to 
"keep . . . Congress fully and currently informed . . . concerning fraud and other serious 
problems, abuses, and deficiencies . . . , to recommend corrective action . . . , and to report 
on the progress made in implementing such corrective action"). 
52. EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5231(d)(1); see also IG Act § 6(a)–(c) (detailing the authority 
of IGs to execute their statutory duties). 
53. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY OFFICES 
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: PAST AND PRESENT 1 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/98-379.pdf ("Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan independent 
offices, [statutory offices of inspector general] now exist in more than 60 establishments and 
entities, including all departments and largest agencies . . . ."). 	The four principal 
responsibilities of IGs are 
(1) conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the programs 
and operations of the agency; (2) providing leadership and coordination and 
recommending policies to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of 
these; (3) preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse in these; and 
(4) keeping the agency head and Congress fully and currently informed about 
problems, deficiencies, and recommended corrective action. 
Id. at 1–2. Congress created IGs in an effort to spearhead a movement toward more 
accountability and ethics in government. See Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, 
The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 
36 ALA. L. REV. 473, 473 (1985) ("The creation of statutory, independent inspectors general 
in the executive branch of the federal government represents a significant new approach to 
the problem of government accountability."); see also Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical 
Government: An Inspector General for the White House, 49 MERCER L. REV. 553, 556–60 
(1998) (discussing how IGs promote an ethical environment in government). 
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Reconstruction (SIGAR), and SIGTARP.54  The corresponding organic 
statutes explicitly require these IGs and SIGIR and SIGAR to report to their 
respective agency heads and to keep these agency heads fully and currently 
informed.55  The statutes also mandate that the IGs and SIGIR and SIGAR 
are to be supervised by their respective agency heads.56 
In contrast to these requirements, EESA does not explicitly require 
SIGTARP to report to or to be supervised by an agency head, prompting 
confusion with respect to the scope of SIGTARP’s authority and freedom.57 
54. BURROWS, supra note 46, at 1. Congress created SIGIR to provide for 
"independent . . . audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations" of the 
reconstruction of Iraq and to provide for "an independent . . . means of keeping [the 
Secretaries of State and Defense] fully and currently informed about problems and 
deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations." See Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, § 3001, 117 Stat. 1209, 1234–38 (establishing 
SIGIR). Congress created SIGAR to provide for "independent . . . audits and investigations 
relating to the programs and operations funded . . . for the reconstruction of Afghanistan" 
and to provide for "an independent . . . means of keeping the [Secretaries of State and 
Defense] fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 
administration of such programs and operations." See National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229, 122 Stat. 3, 378–85 (establishing 
SIGAR). 
55. BURROWS, supra note 46, at 3; see also KAISER, supra note 53, at 2 (providing that 
IGs’ reporting obligations require them to keep their respective agency heads fully and 
currently informed). 
56. BURROWS, supra note 46, at 3; see Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 489 ("The 
IG . . . for each agency [is] . . . supervised by the head of the agency."); KAISER, supra note 
53, at 2 ("IGs serve under the ‘general supervision’ of the agency head . . . ." (quoting IG 
Act § 3(a))). 
57. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 3 ("Unlike IGs in other agencies, who shall 
‘report to and be under the general supervision’ of the agency head, [SIGTARP] will not be 
required to report to, or be supervised by, the head of any agency, including the Secretary of 
the Treasury." (quoting IG Act § 3(a))). "[U]nder one interpretation of [SIGTARP’s] duties 
and responsibilities, . . . [SIGTARP] will report only to Congress and not the agency head. 
This reporting arrangement would be unique among statutory IGs." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
EESA provides that SIGTARP "shall . . . have the duties and responsibilities" of IGs 
pursuant to the IG Act. EESA § 5231(c)(3). However, it is not clear from this generalized 
language whether the IG Act’s requirements that reference interaction with agency heads are 
applicable to SIGTARP. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 4 (noting the confusion 
surrounding the issue whether SIGTARP is responsible for all of the IG duties outlined in 
the IG Act, "even those that reference interaction with the head of an establishment or those 
that reference responsibilities not specifically delineated in EESA"). 
For example, one of the "duties and responsibilities" outlined by the IG Act provides 
that an IG must "keep the head of such establishment and the Congress fully and currently 
informed." IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(5). In addition, while EESA requires that 
SIGTARP submit reports only to Congress, EESA § 121(f)(1), the IG Act requires that IGs 
submit reports both to Congress and to their respective agency heads. IG Act § 5. The 
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EESA makes no explicit reference to an agency head to whom SIGTARP is 
accountable and, while EESA specifically requires that SIGTARP submit 
reports to Congress, EESA does not explicitly require that SIGTARP 
submit reports to an agency head.58  This arrangement distinguishes 
SIGTARP from all other IGs.59 
In fact, even if EESA is interpreted as requiring SIGTARP to report to 
or to be supervised by an agency head, it is not clear from EESA’s language 
whether the Treasury Secretary is SIGTARP’s agency head or whether 
SIGTARP is even part of the Treasury Department.60  This uncertainty with 
inconsistencies between EESA and the IG Act spawn confusion with respect to whether 
SIGTARP must also submit reports to an agency head. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 5 
("[I]t is not clear as to whether [SIGTARP] would need to submit the reports in § 5 of the IG 
Act in addition to the reports required in EESA or whether [SIGTARP] would only be 
responsible for the required reports set forth in EESA."); id. at 6 (observing that the 
"specificity of the language of [EESA’s] report provision could be interpreted to imply that 
the ‘duties and responsibilities’ provision in [EESA] § 121(c)(3) would not extend to the 
reporting requirements [of] § 5 of the IG Act," which requires IGs to submit reports to 
agency heads). 
In addition, there is no explicit provision in EESA that the Treasury Secretary may 
comment on the reports that SIGTARP prepares for Congress. See id. ("There is no explicit 
requirement in EESA that the Treasury Secretary (or anyone else) be allowed to comment on 
reports that [SIGTARP] submits to Congress . . . . SIGAR and SIGIR have such 
requirements enabling the Secretaries of State and Defense to submit comments to the 
appropriate congressional committees . . . ."); see also Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and 
Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 243, 249 (1999) (observing that, although the IG Act requires agency heads to transmit 
IGs’ reports to Congress unchanged, the IG Act also permits agency heads to "send 
comments regarding the report directly to Congress"). 
Hence, "[d]ue to the ambiguous nature of the statutory language in EESA, the scope of 
the powers and authorities of [SIGTARP] is not clear." BURROWS, supra note 46, at 2. 
58. See generally EESA; see also id. § 121(f)(1) (requiring that SIGTARP submit 
quarterly reports only to Congress); BURROWS, supra note 46, at 5 ("EESA requires 
[SIGTARP] to report to Congress only, and not to an establishment head . . . ."). 
59. See id. at 3 (finding that SIGTARP’s reporting arrangement, as delineated by 
EESA, is "unique among statutory IGs"). 
60. See generally EESA; see also Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("[I]t is unclear what 
degree of control, if any, Treasury holds over SIGTARP."). However, "[i]f EESA is 
interpreted to include [certain] reporting requirements . . . of the IG Act, then [SIGTARP] 
could be required to submit certain reports to the establishment head, which would appear to 
be the Secretary of the Treasury, as TARP itself has not been designated an establishment." 
BURROWS, supra note 46, at 5; see also SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27 
(stating SIGTARP’s position that SIGTARP "is an independent entity within Treasury"). 
Furthermore, because SIGTARP is removable by the President, EESA § 121(a)(4), and 
because the power to remove is tantamount to the power to control, it seems clear, at least, 
that SIGTARP is part of the executive branch. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 
(1986) ("Under the separation of powers established by the Framers of the Constitution, . . . 
Congress may not retain the power of removal over an officer performing executive 
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respect to SIGTARP’s autonomy generated thick tension between Treasury 
and SIGTARP as Treasury asserted supervisory authority over SIGTARP in 
April 2009 while SIGTARP stressed its independence from Treasury.61  
This deadlock resulted in Treasury requesting from the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) a legal opinion on the extent 
of SIGTARP’s independence from Treasury.62  However, before OLC 
responded, Treasury withdrew its request for an opinion.63  SIGTARP 
functions. The congressional removal power created a ‘here-and-now subservience’ of the 
Comptroller General to Congress." (citations omitted)). 
61. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("Treasury recently has asserted that, under 
SIGTARP’s governing statutory authority, SIGTARP is subject to Treasury’s oversight and 
control . . . . SIGTARP contends that Congress’s intent, as reflected in EESA, is clearly that 
SIGTARP be completely independent of Treasury."); see also Matt Jaffe, Treasury Dispute 
with Bailout Watchdog Stems from AIG Bonus Audit; Now Congressman Calls for 
Investigation, ABC NEWS, June 19, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/ 
06/treasury-dispute-with-bailout-watchdog-stems-from-aig-bonus-audit-now-congressman-
calls-for-investigation.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("The Treasury Department’s 
ongoing dispute with bailout watchdog Neil Barofsky stems from the Obama 
administration’s refusal in April to hand over documents relating to AIG’s executive 
compensation structure . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In a 
letter by Congressman Jeb Hensarling to Congressional Oversight Panel chair Elizabeth 
Warren, Hensarling penned, "It is my understanding that this disagreement has evolved into 
a debate between the Administration and SIGTARP as to whether SIGTARP is subject to the 
control and supervision of the Administration." Letter from Jeb Hensarling, Deputy 
Republican Whip, U.S. Cong., to Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel (June 19, 
2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Congressman_Hensarling_ 
Requests_Hearings_on_SIGTARP.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
62. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27 ("On April 15, 2009, 
Treasury asked . . . OLC for an opinion on [certain] issues pertaining to SIGTARP . . . ."); 
see also Evan Perez & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Retreats from Standoff with TARP 
Watchdog, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1251933  
55469281319.html ("In April, after butting heads with Mr. Barofsky, Treasury officials 
asked [OLC] for a ruling to clarify that Mr. Barofsky’s office falls under the Treasury 
secretary’s supervision."). Treasury sought OLC’s legal opinion on the following issues: 
(1) "whether SIGTARP is located within Treasury" and (2) "whether [SIGTARP is] subject 
to the Secretary of the Treasury’s . . . general supervision." SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, 
supra note 38, at 27. In response to Treasury’s request, "SIGTARP made clear its position 
that the language and legislative history of section 121 of EESA unambiguously provides 
that SIGTARP is an independent entity within Treasury [and] that [SIGTARP] is not subject 
to the Treasury Secretary’s supervision." Id.; see generally Letter from Neil M. Barofsky, 
Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, to Bernard Knight, Jr., Acting 
General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Dep’t (Apr. 7, 2009), available at 
http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/SIGTARP_position_within_Treasury.pdf.  
63. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27 ("On August 7, 2009, 
Treasury withdrew its request for an OLC opinion."). "The Treasury Department declined to 
explain the reason for the withdrawal of its request to the Justice Department." Perez & 
Solomon, supra note 62. 
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interpreted this withdrawal as "Treasury’s acknowledgement that SIGTARP 
is an independent entity within Treasury, and that [SIGTARP] is not subject 
to the supervision of the Treasury Secretary."64  As congressman Jeb 
Hensarling asserted: "Any threat or appearance of a threat to SIGTARP’s 
independence will undermine and corrupt its important mission."65 
C. Treasury’s Certification Requirement 
Although vague language in EESA creates serious supervisory issues 
with respect to SIGTARP, EESA’s clear language poses legal questions as 
well. In an amendment to EESA, Congress mandated that the Treasury 
Secretary "shall . . . (1) take action to address deficiencies identified by a 
report or investigation of [SIGTARP] or other auditor engaged by the 
TARP; or (2) certify to appropriate committees of Congress that no action 
is necessary or appropriate."66  This "certification" provision of EESA 
initiates separation of powers concerns that are only exacerbated by the 
uncertainty surrounding SIGTARP’s independence from Treasury.67 
In the following pages, this Note endeavors to resolve this issue 
pursuant to Supreme Court precedent. 
64. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 38, at 27. 
65. Letter from Jeb Hensarling to Elizabeth Warren, supra note 61, at 1. In a letter to 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Senator Charles Grassley stated that SIGTARP was 
"created by Congress as a means to combat waste, fraud, and abuse and to be [an] 
independent watchdog[] ensuring" that the Treasury Department is held accountable for its 
actions. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Senator, U.S. Congress, to Timothy F. Geithner, 
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury 1 (June 17, 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/ 
images/Politics/Letter_to_Treasury090618.pdf. Furthermore, Treasury’s contention that 
SIGTARP is subject to Treasury supervision could contravene congressional intent as 
evidenced in EESA. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 (observing that Treasury’s "claim 
seems contrary to Congress’s intent to charge SIGTARP with responsibility for aggressively 
guarding the TARP program from fraud and abuse. In particular, a lack of independence 
from Treasury could tarnish the perception that SIGTARP has the ability to do its job 
effectively"); see also supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (noting that the explicit 
statutory references to agency heads’ supervisory authority over IGs and SIGIR and SIGAR 
are lacking in EESA with respect to SIGTARP). 
66. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. 
67. See Perez & Solomon, supra note 62 ("[I]n establishing [SIGTARP], Congress set 
strict directives that . . . require [the Treasury Secretary] to explain if he declines to follow 
any of Mr. Barofsky’s recommendations. That led to constitutional questions over whether 
Congress violated the separation of powers and invaded the executive branch’s turf."). 
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III. Analysis of SIGTARP’s Separation of Powers Issue Based on 
Supreme Court Precedent 
A. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Separation of Powers 
Inconsistency pervades the Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to 
the separation of powers principle.68  Although the Court has vacillated 
between formalist69  and functionalist70  approaches to the separation of 
68. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 287 ("The Supreme Court offers limited help in 
resolving the basic disputes of separation of powers. Over the last three decades it has 
bounced back and forth, sometimes embracing a functional, pragmatic approach, and at 
other times adopting a doctrinaire, formalistic model."); id. at 290 (noting both the Court’s 
"failure to develop a consistent and coherent theory of separated powers" and the Court’s 
"record of avoiding many of the disputes between Congress and the President"); Magill, 
supra note 2, at 1129 ("[T]he Supreme Court’s case law is no more settled than the 
commentary: It has been called an ‘incoherent muddle,’ produced by a Court that is 
‘stumped’ by separation of powers questions." (footnotes omitted)). 
69. See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS RATIONALE AND APPLICATION 7–8 (1999) (defining 
formalism). "A formalist approach to the consideration of separation of powers issues 
focuses upon the text of the Constitution in an effort to ascertain to what degree branch 
powers and functions may be intermingled." Id. at 7. Because the Constitution divides 
governmental power into three defined categories, "the crux of formalism is that the power 
delegated to a branch should be exercised exclusively by that branch." Id. "The effect of 
this approach is to ascertain whether the activity in question is judicial, executive, or 
legislative in nature, and to circumscribe power which extends beyond the constitutionally 
assigned functions of a particular branch." Id. at 7–8. For a further discussion of formalism, 
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998), and see 
generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987). 
70. See HALSTEAD, supra note 69, at 8 (defining functionalism). "Contrary to 
formalism’s textual focus, a functionalist approach to separation of powers issues centers on 
the notion that precise definitional boundaries cannot serve as a basis for the resolution of 
separation of powers issues." Id. Justice Jackson propounded this functionalist premise 
when he stated that "‘the actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot 
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses 
or even single Articles torn from context.’" Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). "Thus, a functionalist 
approach permits the sharing of power between branches, concerning itself mainly with the 
preservation of the core function of a particular branch where there has been no exclusive 
textual commitment to a particular branch." Id. (citing Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)). "This notion of a core function derives from 
the functionalist theory that the Constitution ascribes a unique and essential power to each 
branch of government, which must be protected from usurpation by the competing 
branches." Id. "Branches may exercise the powers of another, so long as the ability of the 
original branch to exercise such power is not impaired." Id. (citations omitted). For a 
further discussion of the functionalist approach, see Eskridge, supra note 69, at 21–22, and 
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powers issues it has confronted, the Court’s current precedent reveals a 
proclivity for functionalism.71  
see generally Strauss, supra note 69. 
The functionalistic "core function" approach is generally more flexible than the 
"definitional boundaries" approach espoused by the formalistic dogma. HALSTEAD, supra 
note 69, at 8. Eskridge observes that "‘[s]eparation of powers’ connotes relatively formalist 
inquiries of rules, deductions, and sharp lines" whereas "‘[c]hecks and balances[]’ . . . 
connotes relatively functionalist inquires of standards, inductions, and flexible interactions." 
Eskridge, supra note 69, at 22. 
71. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 12–13 ("Between 1983 and 1986, the Court flirted 
with a rigid[,] . . . impractical notion of separation of powers . . . . Although not directly 
overruling those decisions, the Court in 1988 and again in 1989 issued rulings more 
favorable toward the overlapping of powers, emphasizing checks and balances over a pure 
separation of powers." (footnote omitted)). For an overview of the Court’s separation of 
powers jurisprudence over the last three decades, see id. at 287–90. 
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, sought to paint a more systematic portrait of 
the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence. See Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and 
Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 
GA. L. REV. 85, 135 (1995) ("At first blush, Justice Kennedy’s organization of the cases 
appeared to bring a refreshing order to chaos."). In Public Citizen v. United States 
Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), Justice Kennedy divided the Court’s separation 
of powers opinions into two classes. Id. at 484–87. First, Justice Kennedy delineated cases 
in which the presidential power upon which Congress was allegedly infringing "was not 
explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the 
President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President 
of the ‘executive power.’" Id. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). In this line of 
cases, according to Justice Kennedy, "[the Court has] employed something of a balancing 
approach, asking whether the statute at issue prevents the President ‘from accomplishing 
[his] constitutionally assigned functions.’" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988)). Justice Kennedy explicitly incorporated 
Morrison into this grouping of cases, remarking that the relevant aspect of the Court’s 
decision in Morrison "involved the President’s power to remove Executive officers, a 
power . . . not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution (as is the 
appointment power), but rather . . . inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the 
‘executive Power.’" Id. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115–16 (1926)). 
Second, Justice Kennedy defined cases in which "the Constitution by explicit text 
commits the power at issue to the exclusive control of the President." Id. at 485. When 
confronted with such cases, the Court "ha[s] refused to tolerate any intrusion by the 
Legislative Branch." Id.; see also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("The separation-of-powers doctrine has heretofore 
led to the invalidation [by the Supreme Court] of Government action only when the 
challenged action violated some express provision in the Constitution."). Justice Kennedy 
observed that "[w]here a power has been committed to a particular Branch of the 
Government in the text of the Constitution, the balance already has been struck by the 
Constitution itself." Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 486. "It is improper for this Court to arrogate 
to itself the power to adjust a balance settled by the explicit terms of the Constitution . . . . 
[W]here the Constitution draws a clear line, we may not engage in such tinkering." Id. at 
486–87. Justice Kennedy illustrated this line of cases by identifying Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Id. at 486. In Chadha, the Court 
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Although the Court has not entertained a case involving the 
constitutionality of IGs,72  the Court has resolved separation of powers 
issues that are analogous to the issue posed by SIGTARP. In Morrison v. 
Olson,73  the Court ruled that a congressionally imposed "good cause" 
restriction on the President’s removal power over an independent counsel 
did not "impermissibly interfer[e]" with the President’s ability to perform 
his constitutional function.74 	The Court reaffirmed Morrison’s 
invalidated a legislative veto provision on the ground "that it violated the explicit 
constitutional requirement that all legislation be presented to the President for his signature 
before becoming law." Id. (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946–48, 957–59). 
However, Justice Kennedy brought under fire his dual-sectored structure by 
transgressing it himself at the end of the same concurring opinion in which he introduced the 
configuration. See Murchison, supra, at 135 ("The Kennedy concurrence, however, for all 
its doctrinal strivings, was not without serious problems of its own."). After setting forth his 
structure, Justice Kennedy resolved the separation of powers question at issue in Public 
Citizen, which involved the President’s textually explicit appointment power, by engaging in 
a form of balancing. See id. at 135–36 ("Having stated that Public Citizen involved a textual 
grant of power and that balancing is ‘inapplicable,’ Justice Kennedy’s last paragraph 
referred to the section of the district court’s opinion that cited Morrison and engaged in 
balancing." (quoting Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 487)). 
72. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that IGs’ presence 
in executive agencies is of "dubious constitutionality, though the issue has not been raised in 
court"). 
73. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (concluding that a "good cause" 
removal provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 "does not violate the separation-
of-powers principle by impermissibly interfering with the functions of the Executive 
Branch."). In Morrison, the Court considered the constitutionality of the independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–99. 
Id. at 659–60; see also Geoffrey M. McNutt, Note, Formal and Functional Approaches to 
Separation of Powers: The Political Cost of Checks and Balances in Nixon v. United States 
and Morrison v. Olson, 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 281, 288–92 (1995) (dissecting the 
Morrison opinion). The Act required the Attorney General (AG), upon receipt of relevant 
information, to conduct a preliminary investigation into a supposed violation of federal 
criminal law by any person implicated by the Act. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. If the AG 
determined that "there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or 
prosecution is warranted,’" the Act required the AG to apply to a special court created by the 
Act for appointment of an independent counsel (IC). Id. at 661. If, however, the initial 
investigation proved fruitless, the Act required the AG merely to notify the special court of 
this result. Id. In Morrison, the Court found that the IC appointment power vested by the 
Act in the special court did not contravene either Article III or the Appointments Clause of 
Article II. Id. at 670–85. The Court also ruled that the Act’s "good cause" restriction on the 
AG’s power to remove the IC satisfied the separation of powers because the restriction did 
not "unduly trammel[]" on the President’s ability to perform his constitutional function and 
did not "unduly interfer[e]" with the executive branch’s role. Id. at 685–97. 
For an argument entreating the Court to overrule Morrison, see Steven G. Calabresi & 
Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 103 (2009). 
74. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (concluding that the removal restrictions do "not violate 
the separation-of-powers principle by impermissibly interfering with the functions of the 
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functionalist75  construction of the separation of powers doctrine in Mistretta 
v. United States.76  Although the Court’s decisions embrace a functionalist 
interpretation of the separation of powers, they have not overruled previous 
opinions that espouse a formalist vision.77  In Bowsher v. Synar,78  one of 
Executive Branch"). 
75. See HALSTEAD, supra note 69, at 15 (finding that the "functional approach" to 
separation of powers issues "was extended in Morrison"). 
76. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (concluding that 
Congress did not violate either the nondelegation or the separation of powers doctrines by 
creating the United States Sentencing Commission). In Mistretta, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) promulgated by the United States 
Sentencing Commission (Commission) pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(Act), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98. Id. at 362. The Act 
established the Commission as an independent entity within the judicial branch and 
delegated to the Commission the authority to craft the Guidelines, from which a sentencing 
judge was able to depart only if the judge found an aggravating or mitigating factor that the 
Commission did not adequately consider when formulating the Guidelines. Id. at 367–68. 
In Mistretta, the Court found that the Act did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because 
Congress’s assignment to the Commission of the authority to formulate the Guidelines was 
accompanied by sufficiently specific instructions with respect to the Commission’s use of 
that delegated authority. Id. at 371–79. The Court also concluded that the independent 
structure of the Commission within the judicial branch did not violate the separation of 
powers principle because the Commission’s placement could not "possibly be construed as 
preventing the Judicial Branch ‘from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.’" 
Id. at 395–96 (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
77. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 12–13 ("Between 1983 and 1986, the Court flirted 
with a [formalist] notion of separation of powers . . . . Although not directly overruling 
those decisions, the Court in 1988 and again in 1989 issued rulings more favorable toward 
the overlapping of powers, emphasizing checks and balances over a pure separation of 
powers." (footnote omitted)). 
78. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (concluding that the assignment 
by Congress to the Comptroller General of certain functions violated the separation of 
powers because Congress’s reservation of the removal power over the Comptroller General 
was tantamount to congressional supervision of the execution of its laws). In Bowsher, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Act), Pub. L. 
No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). Id. at 
717. The purpose of the Act was to "eliminate the federal budget deficit" by imposing a 
"maximum deficit amount." Id. If this maximum deficit amount was exceeded, the Act 
required the Comptroller General (CG) to prepare a report detailing "across-the-board cuts in 
federal spending." Id. at 717–18. Once the CG forwarded the report to the President, the 
Act required the President to implement the spending reductions. Id. at 718, 733. The Court 
in Bowsher found that the CG, removable only by Congress, exercised executive power 
under the Act’s provisions requiring the CG to prepare the spending reduction report. Id. at 
732–33. The Court concluded that this arrangement violated the separation of powers by 
reserving to Congress control over an official charged with execution of the laws. Id. at 734. 
"By placing the responsibility for execution of the [Act] in the hands of an officer who is 
subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution 
of the Act and has intruded into the executive function." Id. 
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these older formalist79  decisions, the Court concluded that, once Congress 
enacts a piece of legislation, it may not supervise or control the execution of 
that statute.80 
These three decisions yield a consolidated rule with respect to 
separation of powers clashes between Congress and the President: 
Congress (1) may not impermissibly interfere with the President’s ability to 
fulfill his constitutional role, and (2) may not itself supervise or control the 
execution of its laws. 
B. Application of Supreme Court Precedent to SIGTARP’s Separation of 
Powers Issue 
1. Why the SIGTARP Dynamic Violates the Separation of Powers 
Anterior to an application of this Supreme Court precedent to the 
SIGTARP issue is an understanding of why SIGTARP poses a separation 
of powers question. What follows is a synopsis of the argument for why 
the SIGTARP dynamic violates the separation of powers pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s precedent. 
EESA’s amendment mandates that the Treasury Secretary must either 
(1) act to address the deficiencies identified by SIGTARP with respect to 
TARP, or (2) certify to Congress that no action is necessary or 
appropriate.81 	This certification requirement could impermissibly 
interfere82  with the President’s ability to fulfill his constitutional function 
by compelling executive accountability to Congress with respect to how 
Treasury utilizes its discretion in executing EESA.83  This accountability 
79. See id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s "willingness to 
interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the attainment 
of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the Congress and the President in 
the legislative process established by the Constitution"). 
80. See id. at 726, 734 (majority opinion) ("The structure of the Constitution does not 
permit Congress to execute the laws . . . . [or to] retain[] control over the execution of [its 
laws] and [thereby] intrude[] into the executive function."). "[O]nce Congress makes its 
choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the 
execution of its enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation." Id. at 733–34 
(citing Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983)). 
81. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. 
82. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court 
precedent that finds that Congress may not, consistent with the separation of powers, act vis-
à-vis the President in a manner that impermissibly interferes with the President’s ability to 
fulfill his role as delineated by the Constitution). 
83. See SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121 (providing that, if the Treasury Secretary 
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dynamic might impose upon the Treasury Secretary a mild congressional 
threat in the form of an "either/or" demand—either the Secretary must 
comply with SIGTARP’s recommendations or the Secretary must justify to 
Congress his refusal to comply with those recommendations.84  By forcing 
this choice on the Secretary, EESA arguably imposes a severe constraint on 
the executive’s discretion in administering TARP, especially 
considering the political arena in which the President operates.85  The 
President will likely bear in mind that the Secretary’s refusal to comply 
with SIGTARP will not sit well with the voting public, who will likely 
perceive SIGTARP as a civil servant operating in the public interest to 
monitor Treasury’s dispersal of the $700 billion of TARP taxpayer 
money.86 
However, EESA’s certification provision would tend to coerce 
presidential action even without the aid of the political machine.87  By 
elects not to follow SIGTARP’s recommendations, the Secretary must "certify" to the 
appropriate congressional committees that no action is necessary or appropriate). 
84. Id., sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. 
85. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 702, 713–14 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the negative political effects on the President should he choose not to appoint an 
independent counsel in response to a congressional request for such an appointment for the 
purpose of investigating alleged criminal violations of lower executive officials). 
86. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,849 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Erik 
Paulsen) ("[T]he American people deserve to know when Washington is spending taxpayer 
dollars, and we are making every effort [through creating SIGTARP] to ensure that those 
taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely . . . . American taxpayers deserve no less."). 
Congressman Paulsen stated: 
When the Federal Government is literally spending hundreds of billions of 
dollars, it is critical that we have the most stringent oversight of that spending. 
That is our obligation to the taxpayer . . . . They have the absolute right to know 
that their money—it is their money—is being spent properly and wisely. 
Id. at H3,851; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 702, 713–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the 
political consequences of a presidential refusal to comply with an ostensibly just demand by 
Congress to appoint an independent counsel). "As a practical matter," Scalia observed, "it 
would be surprising if the Attorney General had any choice . . . but to seek appointment of 
an independent counsel to pursue the charges against the principal object of the 
congressional request . . . ." Id. at 701–02. "Merely the political consequences (to . . . the 
President) of seeming to break the law by refusing to do so would have been substantial." 
Id. at 702. "How could it be, the public would ask, that a 3,000-page indictment drawn by 
our representatives over [two-and-a-half] years does not establish ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ that further investigation or prosecution is warranted with respect to at least the 
principal alleged culprit?" Id. 
87. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the negative 
political consequences of a presidential refusal to acquiesce to a congressional request to 
appoint an independent counsel and then observing that "the [independent counsel statute] 
establishes more than just practical compulsion"). Justice Scalia then analyzed his 
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requiring the Secretary to report to Congress, EESA implicitly obliges 
the executive to determine whether the action recommended by 
SIGTARP is necessary or appropriate.88  If the Secretary determines that 
the recommended action is necessary or appropriate, EESA could be 
interpreted to mandate the executive’s compliance with SIGTARP’s 
recommendation. In other words, EESA’s certification requirement, 
apart from levying upon the executive branch a constitutionally 
questionable duty of explanation, might impermissibly interfere with the 
President’s ability to execute the laws according to his own judgment by 
imposing upon the President an obligation to comply with SIGTARP’s 
recommendations unless the responses recommended by SIGTARP are 
both unnecessary and inappropriate.89 
If SIGTARP were an official subject to full executive supervision 
and control, perhaps this statutory construction might not arouse serious 
separation of powers concerns. However, although SIGTARP is 
removable by the President,90  SIGTARP appears to be completely 
immune to Treasury supervision and might not even be part of the 
Treasury Department.91  Conversely, because SIGTARP reports only to 
Congress,92  and because SIGTARP’s duty as an IG requires him to 
maintain an evaluative detachment from the executive branch,93  
SIGTARP’s loyalties are more likely directed toward Congress94  and, 
interpretation of the statute, which he construed to mandate presidential compliance unless 
there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation was warranted into 
supposed criminal violations by lower executive officials. Id. 
88. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121. 
89. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 701–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making a parallel 
argument with respect to the effect of another congressional statute, namely, that the statute 
"requires the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel . . . 
unless he determines . . . that ‘there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further 
investigation or prosecution is warranted.’" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1))). 
90. See supra note 60 (observing that the power to remove is tantamount to the power 
to control). 
91. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (noting EESA’s vague language 
with respect to SIGTARP’s independence from Treasury). 
92. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (observing that EESA explicitly 
requires SIGTARP to report only to Congress). 
93. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that Congress 
passed the IG Act to "check abuse in the executive branch"). 
94. See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary 
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 680 (2005) (stating that the 
Department of Justice initially denounced the IG Act as making "the [IGs] subject to divided 
and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches, in violation 
of the doctrine of separation of powers" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
400 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375 (2011) 
furthermore, SIGTARP is likely subject to congressional influence.95 
Hence, the recommendations that SIGTARP conveys to Treasury could 
be intermingled with congressional instructions to Treasury with respect 
to administering TARP. This likelihood directly affects the equilibrium 
of power between the executive and legislative branches if, as discussed 
above, EESA is interpreted to require both executive accountability to 
Congress and executive compliance with SIGTARP recommendations 
that are either necessary or appropriate.96  In essence, Congress could 
have strategically inserted SIGTARP into the TARP program in a subtle 
effort to supervise the execution of its monumental97  $700 billion 
governmental bailout program in violation of the Supreme Court’s 
separation of powers precedent.98 
2. Supreme Court Precedent Applied to the SIGTARP Separation of 
Powers Issue 
a. Compelling Executive Accountability to Congress Through the 
Certification Requirement 
Congress, through EESA, presents to the Treasury Secretary two 
options: (1) act to address TARP-related deficiencies identified by 
SIGTARP, or (2) certify to Congress that "no action is necessary or 
appropriate."99  By obliging the Secretary to "certify" to Congress when 
he elects not to take action, Congress essentially has compelled 
executive accountability with respect to how the Secretary responds to 
SIGTARP’s recommendations. 	This congressionally imposed 
"either/or" ultimatum raises both Morrison and Bowsher issues, as 
95. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 83 ("[Congress] can apply irresistible pressure both 
for and against [executive] agency employees through its investigative power." (citing Louis 
Fisher, Congress and the Removal Power, in DIVIDED DEMOCRACY 255–74 (James A. 
Thurber ed., 1991))); see also id. at 80 ("One scholar estimated that congressional pressure is 
responsible for more firings and reassignments of executive branch personnel than is 
presidential action."). 
96. See SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121 (requiring the Treasury 
Secretary to certify to Congress that no action with respect to a SIGTARP recommendation 
is necessary or appropriate). 
97. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (observing that Congress’s TARP 
program qualifies as the largest governmental economic intervention program in history). 
98. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (finding that Congress may not, 
consistent with the Constitution, supervise or control the execution of its laws). 
99. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. 
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constraining the executive to choose between these two alternatives 
could impermissibly interfere with the President’s ability to execute 
EESA according to his own constitutional prerogative,100  and could 
likewise constitute a congressional attempt to supervise the execution of 
EESA.101 
(1) Ascertaining the Meaning of "Certify" 
Before this constitutional analysis may proceed, however, the precise 
import of the term "certify" must be considered.102  "Certify" could signify 
simply that the Secretary must notify Congress of his decision not to heed a 
SIGTARP recommendation. In essence, a stoic communication, indicating 
that the Secretary will not address a TARP-related deficiency identified by 
SIGTARP because no action is necessary or appropriate (merely parroting 
the statutory language), might satisfy the certification requirement.103 
However, this benign construal of the statute likely contradicts 
congressional intent.104  EESA’s legislative history reveals that Congress 
contemplated extracting from the Secretary a statement explaining and 
justifying his belief that no action is necessary or appropriate with respect 
to a recommendation from SIGTARP.105  Furthermore, this latter 
100. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (discussing the rule set forth by the 
Court in Morrison, namely, that Congress violates the separation of powers when it 
impermissibly interferes with the executive’s ability to accomplish its constitutional 
function). 
101. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s precedent in 
Bowsher, which stands for the proposition that Congress may not, consistent with the 
Constitution, supervise or control the execution of its laws). 
102. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121. 
103. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that "perfunctory" 
responses have satisfied similar executive reporting requirements in the past). "A President 
may remove an IG, but only after reporting his reasons to Congress [pursuant to the IG Act], 
which raises separation of powers concerns." Id. "We note, however, that in practice the 
reasons can be perfunctory, as when President Reagan told Congress that he was removing 
all the IGs because he needed to have the ‘fullest confidence in the ability, integrity and 
commitment’ of each." Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 1, at 73 ("In 1981 Reagan removed 
a dozen [IGs] governed by the [IG Act] but did not submit reasons to Congress other than a 
general desire to have nominees of his own choosing."). 
104. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) ("[T]he only concern of 
courts is to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed."). 
105. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,848 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis 
Moore) (noting that EESA "requir[es] the Treasury Secretary to explain why any SIGTARP 
recommendation is not implemented"); see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-41(I), at 8–9 (2009) 
(noting that EESA’s certification provision "[r]equires Treasury to notify Congress of the 
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interpretation harmonizes more closely with the broader thrust of EESA, 
which contains other provisions evidencing Congress’s desire to receive 
continuing details on the executive’s management of TARP.106  The 
important point is that, whichever interpretation prevails, the certification 
requirement effectively compels executive accountability,107  provoking 
separation of powers questions. 
(2) The Certification Provision as a Mechanism for 
Congressional Oversight 
As discussed above, the Court in Bowsher concluded that, once 
Congress enacts legislation, it may not supervise the execution of those 
reason for failing to follow any written recommendations made by SIGTARP"). The House 
Report’s use of the word "notify" could suggest Congress’s intent to require only a stoic 
communication, void of any explanation, in the event that Treasury opts not to comply with 
a SIGTARP recommendation. Supra note 103 and accompanying text. However, the House 
Report also manifests Congress’s intent to oblige Treasury to proffer a "reason" for the 
executive’s failure to take action on a recommendation from SIGTARP. H.R. REP. NO. 111- 
41(I), at 8–9. This suggests that, by imposing the certification requirement upon Treasury, 
Congress sought to elicit from the executive more than a mere bare-bones notification. 
106. See, e.g., EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 121(c)(1) (listing a host of factors involving the 
executive’s administration of TARP upon which Congress desires to remain informed). 
EESA commissions SIGTARP to 
conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the purchase, 
management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the Treasury under 
[TARP] . . . , including by collecting and summarizing the following 
information: 
(A) A description of the categories of troubled assets purchased or otherwise 
procured by the Secretary. 
(B) A listing of the troubled assets purchased in each such category described 
under subparagraph (A). 
(C) An explanation of the reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to purchase 
each such troubled asset. 
(D) A listing of each financial institution that such troubled assets were 
purchased from. 
(E) A listing of and detailed biographical information on each person or entity 
hired to manage such troubled assets. 
(F) A current estimate of the total amount of troubled assets purchased pursuant 
to [TARP], the amount of troubled assets on the books of the Treasury, the 
amount of troubled assets sold, and the profit and loss incurred on each sale or 
disposition of each such troubled asset. 
Id. § 121(c)(1)(A)–(F). 
107. It is acknowledged, however, that the substance of the executive’s certification 
will vary depending upon which interpretation is embraced. 
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laws except through adopting new legislation.108  Despite the Court’s 
straightforward ruling, congressional supervision of executive 
implementation of the laws nonetheless persists.109  In fact, one of the 
recognized ways in which Congress controls the execution of its laws is 
through executive reporting requirements.110  The IG Act itself imposes 
108. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (discussing the separation of 
powers rule in Bowsher). 
109. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 289 (spurning the Bowsher rule as an "unrealistic 
opinion" and one that has been rendered moot by practical considerations); Fisher, supra 
note 28, at 143 (finding that "congressional oversight of executive activities is a legitimate 
constitutional responsibility"). "[T]he Court claims in Bowsher that ‘once Congress makes 
its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the 
execution of its enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation.’" Id. at 143 (quoting 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986)). "That, of course, is nonsense. Congress 
controls the execution of its laws through hearings, committee investigations, studies by the 
General Accounting Office, informal contacts between members of Congress and agency 
officials, and nonstatutory controls." Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 1, at 289 (reviewing 
the Bowsher rule and then observing that "[n]o one who reads the newspapers can believe 
that"); Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives 
to the "Legislative Veto", 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 668 (1980) ("[S]ome observers have 
attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other 
matters."). "Congress controls the execution of laws when each house invokes its contempt 
power and when committees issue subpoenas." Fisher, supra note 28, at 143. In reality, 
"[c]ontinued participation by Congress does not require the passage of public laws." FISHER, 
supra note 1, at 289. 
This continued participation by Congress is referred to as congressional oversight. 
Some argue that, "without some means of overseeing the postenactment activities of the 
executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been 
implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention 
is appropriate." Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional Oversight and the 
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 460 (1977); see 1 
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 169 (J.V. Pritchard ed., Thomas Nugent 
trans., Fred. B. Rothman & Co. rev. ed. 1991) ("[T]he legislative power in a free state . . . 
has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been 
executed . . . ."); Javits & Klein, supra, at 472–73 ("The purpose of congressional oversight 
is to ensure that the Executive is administering the law in accordance with a dynamic 
political intent based on Congress’s current interpretation of the public interest."); but see 
Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 501 ("The DOJ emphasized that it ‘ha[d] repeatedly 
taken the position that continuous oversight of the functioning of Executive agencies . . . is 
not a proper legislative function.’" (footnote omitted)). "As an instrument of political 
accountability then, congressional or legislative oversight is implicit in the constitutional 
system of checks and balances." Javits & Klein, supra, at 460 (footnote omitted). 
110. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.19 
(1983) ("The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its 
administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls 
administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of control, such 
as . . . formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress’ [sic] constitutional power."); 
see also Javits & Klein, supra note 109, at 460–61 (finding that legislative oversight 
includes "formal reporting requirements"). 
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upon the President a reporting requirement, enjoining the President, in the 
event that he removes an IG from office, to explain to Congress the reasons 
for that removal.111 
Two executive reporting requirements survived the Court’s review in 
Morrison. By upholding the independent counsel statute, the Court in 
Morrison implicitly ratified two component reporting provisions 
compelling the executive to convey information to Congress. One of the 
provisions required the President to file an explanatory report with 
Congress in response to a congressional request for the appointment of an 
independent counsel,112  and the other provision required the President to 
submit an explanatory report to Congress in the event that the President 
removed the independent counsel from office.113 
Despite the Court’s favorable treatment of this congressional control 
mechanism, the Constitution explicitly recognizes only one instance in 
111. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(b) ("An [IG] may be removed from office by the 
President. The President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both 
Houses of Congress."). This provision is applicable to SIGTARP through EESA. EESA 
§ 121(b)(4). The Department of Justice’s OLC initially opposed this reporting provision. 
See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 18 (1977) ("[T]he requirement that the President 
notify both Houses of Congress of the reasons for his removal of an [IG] constitutes an 
improper restriction on the President’s exclusive power to remove Presidentially appointed 
executive officers." (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))). Although OLC 
conceded that Congress wields the power to restrict the President’s removal power over 
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative officers, id. (citing Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 
(1958), and Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)), OLC asserted that "the 
power to remove a subordinate appointed officer within one of the executive departments is 
a power reserved to the President acting in his discretion." Id. However, OLC eventually 
capitulated to the passage of the IG Act in a legislative-executive compromise. See Gates & 
Knowles, supra note 53, at 502 ("The most important provisions of the compromise were to 
require that [IGs] report to Congress through the Secretary, who could not change the 
content of the report but who could respond to it, and to eliminate the limits on the 
President’s authority to remove an IG." (footnote omitted)). However, the Supreme Court 
has never considered the constitutionality of the IG Act. See supra note 72 and 
accompanying text (observing that the constitutionality of IGs has never been entertained by 
the Court). 
112. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("The Act does empower certain 
Members of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an 
independent counsel, but the Attorney General has no duty to comply with the request, 
although he must respond within a certain time limit." (citations omitted)); id. at 702–03 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Where, as here, a request for appointment of an independent counsel 
has come from [Congress], the Attorney General must, if he decides not to seek 
appointment, explain to that [congressional] Committee why." (citations omitted)). 
113. See id. at 663 (majority opinion) ("If an independent counsel is removed pursuant 
to this section, the Attorney General is required to submit a report to [appropriate 
congressional committees] specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such 
removal." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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which the President is required to report to Congress.114  Apart from this 
patent constitutional concern with respect to the executive reporting 
requirement involving SIGTARP, this reporting provision could also 
transgress Morrison. Because TARP is such a politically charged program, 
the executive accountability dynamic created by EESA automatically 
bootstraps into the equation the political implications surrounding TARP.115 
The glare of the public eye upon the executive’s administration of billions 
of dollars of TARP taxpayer money, coupled with the duty to answer to 
Congress if the Secretary spurns one of SIGTARP’s recommendations, 
combines to produce a potent weapon for executive coercion.116  The 
Secretary might feel pressured into complying with SIGTARP just so that 
he does not have to account to Congress and so that he does not appear to 
the watchful public to be disregarding the recommendations of an 
independent auditor commissioned to safeguard TARP’s massive public 
fund.117  Therefore, this dual-accountability dynamic created by EESA’s 
"either/or" ultimatum might contravene Morrison by impermissibly 
restricting the executive’s discretion in administering TARP. 
114. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall from time to time give to the 
Congress Information of the State of the Union . . . ."). Furthermore, it was the view of at 
least some of the Founders that "[t]he principle of the Constitution is that of a separation of 
legislative, executive, and judiciary functions, except in cases specified." ALLISON ET AL., 
supra note 27, at 623 (quoting 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 108 
(emphasis added)). 
115. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (observing that Congress’s TARP 
program qualifies as the largest governmental economic intervention program in history). 
The fact that Congress has committed at least $700 billion of taxpayer money to TARP will 
simply increase the political attention surrounding the administration of TARP. See supra 
notes 38–39 and accompanying text (observing that, although Congress has expressly 
allocated only $700 billion to TARP, the total expenditures with respect to TARP could 
exceed $23 trillion). 
116. Cf. Morrison, 478 U.S. at 701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the 
executive accountability contemplated by the independent counsel statute gave rise to grave 
political concerns). "As a practical matter, it would be surprising if the Attorney General 
had any choice . . . but to seek appointment of an independent counsel to pursue the charges 
against the principal object of the congressional request . . . ." Id.; see also supra notes 85– 
86 and accompanying text (exploring further the political consequences implicated by the 
potentially coercive provisions of both EESA and the independent counsel statute in 
Morrison). 
117. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("SIGTARP’s stated goal is to ensure that 
taxpayers are aware of who is receiving TARP funds and how those funds are being used."). 
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(3) The Court’s Record of Upholding Executive Reporting Requirements 
Justice Scalia advanced a similar argument in Morrison, expressing 
disquietude concerning the potential for politically generated coercion in 
the event that the executive declined to respond affirmatively to a 
congressional request for the appointment of an independent counsel.118 
However, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s concerns, the majority in 
Morrison acknowledged no such possibility. Likewise, in the event a 
question of SIGTARP’s constitutionality reaches the Supreme Court, the 
Court is unlikely to acknowledge such a possibility with respect to 
SIGTARP. 
Hence, even though EESA’s executive certification requirement 
operates as a tool for congressional supervision over the execution of 
EESA119  (in direct contravention of Bowsher), similar reporting 
requirements have been upheld by the Court. In fact, a reporting 
requirement examined by the Court in Morrison mirrors the certification 
requirement at issue in this Note.120  Based on the Court’s lack of anxiety 
with respect to upholding the reporting requirement in Morrison, this same 
attitude will likely prevail with respect to the certification requirement in 
EESA. 
118. See supra notes 85–86 (discussing the political consequences involved with the 
independent counsel statute in Morrison). 
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (observing that one of the recognized 
ways in which Congress supervises the execution of its laws is through reporting 
requirements). 
120. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)–(c) (2006) (mandating that the Attorney General 
must notify a special judicial body if he determines that "there are no reasonable grounds to 
believe that further investigation is warranted" and, thus, that an independent counsel should 
be appointed), with SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121 (requiring the 
Treasury Secretary to certify to Congress that no action with respect to a recommendation 
from SIGTARP is necessary or appropriate). With respect to the statute at issue in 
Morrison, when Congress itself (as opposed to the special judicial body) requested the 
Attorney General to investigate possible criminal activity within the executive branch, the 
Attorney General was required to respond to Congress regardless of whether the Attorney 
General decided to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 592(g)(2). This unconditional reporting requirement could be considered more exacting 
than EESA’s conditional reporting requirement, obliging the Secretary to report to Congress 
only in the event that the Secretary elects not to address a TARP-related deficiency 
identified by SIGTARP. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. 
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b. Mandating the Treasury Secretary’s Compliance with SIGTARP 
Recommendations that Are Either Necessary or Appropriate 
Although the certification requirement functions as a mechanism for 
congressional supervision over the execution of EESA, this constitutional 
issue is dwarfed by the loss of executive discretion that is contemplated by 
the language of this provision. EESA’s plain language requires the Secretary 
either (1) to take action to address TARP-related deficiencies identified by 
SIGTARP or (2) to certify to Congress that "no action is necessary or 
appropriate."121  As noted above, one plausible interpretation of this provision 
requires the executive to take action with respect to a TARP-related 
deficiency identified by SIGTARP unless "no action is necessary or 
appropriate."122  Pursuant to this statutory construction, one interpretation of 
the Secretary’s protocol as mandated by the provision would be as follows. 
(1) Determining Whether SIGTARP’s Recommended Action Is Necessary or 
Appropriate 
First, the provision is framed in a manner that creates a presumption of 
action, as the first option presented to the executive requires the Secretary to 
take action to address a deficiency identified by SIGTARP.123  If the 
executive desires to avoid addressing a deficiency identified by SIGTARP or, 
in other words, if the executive desires to rebut this presumption of action, the 
Secretary must make a precedent determination that no action is necessary or 
appropriate.124  Hence, the Secretary first must consider whether taking action 
to address a TARP-related deficiency identified by SIGTARP is 
"necessary."125  Before arriving at the determination of whether action is 
necessary, the Secretary must delineate the precise meaning of the word 
"necessary." In M’Culloch v. Maryland,126  Chief Justice Marshall rejected a 
121. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. 
122. See CONG. REC. H3,849 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Erik Paulsen) 
(noting that EESA is intended to "requir[e] the Secretary of the Treasury to take action, or 
certify that no action is necessary, when any problems or deficiencies are identified by 
[SIGTARP]"). 
123. SIGTARP Act, sec 4(2)(f)(1), § 121. 
124. See id., sec 4(2)(f)(2), § 121 (stating that the Secretary must certify to Congress 
that no action is necessary or appropriate). 
125. Id. 
126. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 425, 436 (1819) (concluding that a 
federal statute incorporating a bank was constitutional pursuant to Congress’s power under 
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rigid, "indispensable necessity" construction of the term "necessary"127  and, 
instead, adopted a permissive128  interpretation that now serves as the bedrock 
for the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.129 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and, thus, that a state statute purporting to levy a tax upon 
that federal bank was "unconstitutional and void"). In M’Culloch, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Maryland statute that imposed a tax upon a federally chartered bank 
that lay within the borders of the state. Id. at 319. After the federal bank refused to pay the 
tax, the state of Maryland contended that, because the Constitution does not expressly 
allocate to Congress the power to charter a bank, the federal law establishing the bank was 
therefore repugnant to the Constitution. Id. at 406–07. However, the Court, in an opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Marshall, concluded that Congress, pursuant to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, received the power to charter the bank as an implied power flowing from 
Congress’s enumerated taxing power. Id. at 400–25. In the seminal excerpt from the 
opinion, interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Marshall penned, "Let 
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Hence, because the 
bank was chartered by Congress pursuant to the supreme law of the land, Maryland, as a 
state, lacked the power to levy a tax upon that bank. Id. at 425–37. 
127. See id. at 413 (rejecting the argument that "the ‘word’ necessary [means] limiting 
the right to pass laws for the execution of granted powers[] to such as are indispensable"); 
see also U.S. v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) ("In construing [the Necessary 
and Proper Clause] it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties, if the 
opinion should be maintained that no law was authorised [sic] which was not indispensably 
necessary to give effect to a specified power."); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the 
Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801–1805, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 930 
(1982) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall rejected a construction of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause contemplating "a requirement of indispensable necessity [that] would have 
been so confining that it could hardly have been intended"). The Court in M’Culloch 
observed that "[i]t must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, 
so far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution." M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 
415. "This could not be done, by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not 
to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which 
were conducive to the end." Id. 
128. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 413–14 ("To employ the means necessary to an end, is 
generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as 
being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely 
unattainable."); see also Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396 ("Where various systems might be 
adopted for that purpose, it might be said . . . that it was not necessary because the end might 
be obtained by other means, [but] Congress . . . must be empowered to use any means which 
are . . . conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution."). Marshall 
observed that "[a] thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably 
necessary." M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 414. In the passage for which M’Culloch has come to be 
known, the Court concluded, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional." Id. at 421. 
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress shall have power "[t]o 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
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However, in defining the term "necessary" as it appears in EESA, 
deference may be given to Chief Justice Marshall’s practice of also 
considering the context in which the term is utilized.130  In M’Culloch, 
"necessary and proper" comprised the context in which the word 
"necessary" was employed by the drafters of the Constitution.131  Marshall 
recognized a direct correlation between the two words, deducing that 
"proper" relaxed the "strict and rigorous meaning" of the preceding term, 
"necessary."132 
However, employing Marshall’s modus operandi likely will result in a 
different conclusion with respect to EESA’s certification provision. The 
word "and," as utilized in the Necessary and Proper Clause, suggests a 
connection between the contiguous words, implying that "necessary" and 
"proper" should be considered jointly as part of a single, unified analysis. 
Conversely, Congress inserted the word "or" between the terms "necessary" 
and "appropriate" as they appear in EESA. In contrast to the word "and," 
the term "or" signifies not a mutual correlation, but instead, a distinct 
detachment between the adjacent words.133  Hence, within the context of 
EESA, the terms "necessary" and "appropriate" should be considered 
separately and sequentially, and not as part of a single, unified analysis. 
For this reason, when determining whether to take action to address a 
TARP-related deficiency identified by SIGTARP, the Secretary initially 
must make an isolated determination with respect to whether action is 
necessary.134  If the Secretary concludes that action is necessary, EESA 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"). 
130. See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 418 ("In ascertaining the sense in which the word 
‘necessary’ is used in [the Necessary and Proper Clause], we may derive some aid from that 
with which it is associated."). 
131. Id. at 418–19. 
132. See id. ("If the word ‘necessary’ was used in [a] strict and rigorous sense . . . , it 
would be an extraordinary departure from the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited 
in composition, to add a word, the only possible effect of which is, to qualify that strict and 
rigorous meaning . . . ."). 
133. While the word "or" might also be employed to connote similarity between two 
adjoining words (such as in the phrase "substance or meaning"), this construction likely does 
not comport with the phrase "necessary or appropriate," in which the adjoining words do not 
bear such similarity. 	SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121. 
Furthermore, although Chief Justice Marshall found correspondence between two seemingly 
incompatible words ("necessary and proper"), the connector "and," not "or," was utilized in 
that phrase. Supra notes 130–33. 
134. See supra notes 125–33 (endeavoring to ascertain the precise meaning of the term 
"necessary" as used in EESA’s executive certification requirement). Although the precise 
meaning of "necessary" is unclear, it is not the purpose of this Note to discern the specific 
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could be construed to compel the Secretary to undertake that action. 
According to the statutory language, if the Secretary elects not to take 
action, he must certify to Congress that no action is necessary or 
appropriate.135  Thus, if action is in fact necessary, then the Secretary 
cannot, in accordance with the statute, proffer a contrary certification to 
Congress.136 
If the executive determines that no action is necessary, the inquiry 
does not end there. Instead, the Secretary must proceed to the second, 
distinct question of whether action is "appropriate."137  If the executive 
determines that taking action on a TARP-related deficiency as identified by 
SIGTARP is not appropriate, then the Secretary may elect not to take action 
and may certify to Congress, in accordance with the statute, that no action 
is necessary or appropriate.138  However, if the Secretary believes that 
action is appropriate,139  the Secretary must initiate that action because the 
Secretary in fact could not, in accordance with the statute, certify to 
Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate.140  If the Secretary 
determined that action was appropriate, yet nonetheless tendered to 
Congress a contrary certification, this false certification in direct 
contravention of the statute would comprise a blatant refusal to execute the 
law according to statutory directives.141 
congressional intent behind the word’s precise meaning. 
135. SIGTARP Act, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), § 121. 
136. See id. (mandating that the Secretary must certify to Congress that no action is 
necessary or appropriate). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. It is not the purpose of this Note to pinpoint the precise import of the term 
"appropriate." Suffice it to say, however, that the Secretary, according to the statute, must 
determine whether action is appropriate. 
140. Id. 
141. In discussing the independent counsel statute at issue in Morrison, Justice Scalia 
argued that the statute imposed upon the Attorney General a duty to comply with a 
congressional request for the appointment of an independent counsel unless the Attorney 
General could conclude that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further 
investigation was warranted. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 702 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Scalia then commented that the majority "makes much of the fact that the courts 
are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General’s decision not to seek 
appointment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Scalia countered by asserting, "Yes, 
but Congress is not prevented from reviewing it. The context of this statute is acrid with the 
smell of threatened impeachment." Id. (footnote omitted); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4– 
5 (conferring upon Congress the power of impeachment). For a more detailed discussion of 
Morrison and the independent counsel statute, see supra notes 73–74 and accompanying 
text, and infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
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However, this situation does not constitute the only discretion-
restricting problem created by EESA’s certification provision. The 
provision also produces a decision-making dynamic in which SIGTARP 
creates a baseline consisting of problems that it has determined must be 
addressed by Treasury. The Secretary is required to "take action" to 
address these problems. The implication is that the Secretary is to take such 
action without delay. The Secretary’s only other option is to certify that 
immediate action is neither necessary nor appropriate. As such, Congress 
has created a presumption of action that the Secretary may rebut—but only 
within the parameters set by Congress. The Secretary is therefore 
preempted from concluding that action is "necessary" but best pursued at a 
later time or under different circumstances. Furthermore, if the Secretary 
determines that immediate action on SIGTARP-identified deficiencies is 
not necessary, he must proceed to determine whether such action is 
nevertheless "appropriate." If he determines that action on SIGTARP-
identified deficiencies is indeed "appropriate," but that action on other 
deficiencies not identified by SIGTARP is more appropriate for immediate 
action, EESA’s certification provision restricts his discretion to elect the 
latter option. 
(2) The Independent Counsel Statute in Morrison 
Whether the previous analysis (concluding that the Secretary must take 
immediate action to address TARP-related deficiencies identified by 
SIGTARP that are either necessary or appropriate) accurately comports 
with what the statute requires ultimately distills into a question of statutory 
interpretation. A contrary construction of the statute is likewise plausible. 
In Morrison, the Court entertained a statute that was susceptible to a 
meaning similar to the one advocated by this Note with respect to EESA’s 
certification provision.142  The problematic statute in Morrison provided, in 
relevant part, that: 
If the Attorney General, upon completion of a preliminary investigation 
under this chapter, determines that there are no reasonable grounds to 
believe that further investigation is warranted, the Attorney General 
shall promptly so notify the division of the court, and the division of the 
court shall have no power to appoint an independent counsel with 
respect to the matters involved. 
142. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659 (stating that the case presented the Court with a 
constitutional challenge with respect to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978). 
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. . . . 
The Attorney General shall apply to the division of the court for the 
appointment of an independent counsel if . . . the Attorney General, 
upon completion of a preliminary investigation under this chapter, 
determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that further 
investigation is warranted; or . . . the 90-day period . . . and any 
extension granted . . . have elapsed and the Attorney General has not 
filed a notification with the division of the court . . . .143 
In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Scalia urged the Court to adopt a 
statutory construction that imposed upon the Attorney General "a duty to 
comply [with a request for the appointment of an independent counsel] 
unless he could conclude that there were ‘no reasonable grounds to 
believe,’ . . . that ‘further investigation’ was warranted."144  However, 
despite Scalia’s insistence to the contrary, the majority in Morrison adopted 
an interpretation of the independent counsel statute that contemplated no 
such executive duty of compliance.145  Unless EESA’s certification clause 
is distinguishable from the independent counsel statute, the Court’s 
reasoning in Morrison will likely control. 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)–(c) (2006). 
144. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)). "Thus, by the application of this statute in the present case, Congress 
has effectively compelled a criminal investigation of a high-level appointee of the 
President . . . ." Id. at 703. Justice Scalia continued by asserting: 
[W]e . . . know that the investigation of [this high-level presidential appointee] 
has been commenced, not necessarily because the President or his authorized 
subordinates believe it is in the interest of the United States, . . . and not even . . . 
because the President or his authorized subordinates necessarily believe that an 
investigation is likely to unearth a violation worth prosecuting; but only because 
the Attorney General cannot affirm, as Congress demands, that there are no 
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted. 
Id. Justice Scalia noted that the statute gave rise to a "condition that renders . . . a request 
[for the appointment of an independent counsel] mandatory." Id. at 707. That condition, 
according to Scalia, was the "inability to find ‘no reasonable grounds to believe’ that further 
investigation is warranted." Id. 
145. See id. at 694 (majority opinion) ("The Act does empower certain Members of 
Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an independent 
counsel, but the Attorney General has no duty to comply with the request, although he must 
respond within a certain time limit." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 592(g))). The majority also noted 
that, "[u]nlike previous cases, [like] Bowsher v. Synar, this case simply does not pose a 
‘dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions.’" Id. (quoting 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)). 
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(3) The Court’s Willingness to Tolerate Congressional Restriction of 
Executive Discretion as long as the Stripped Discretion Is Not 
Absorbed by Congress 
Although the statutory language is different, the general meaning 
behind both statutes is similar.146  Despite the Morrison majority’s 
unwillingness to read into the statute an executive duty of compliance, the 
statutory language clearly imposes upon the executive a duty to comply 
with a request for the appointment of an independent counsel if the 
executive "determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
further investigation is warranted."147  Furthermore, the Court in Morrison 
never explicitly rejected the construction that the statute both effectuated a 
degree of executive coercion and mandated compliance if reasonable 
grounds exist.148  Instead, the Court hung its hat on the fact that Congress 
did not "retain[] for itself . . . [the] power[] of control or supervision over an 
independent counsel," and that Congress did not attempt "to increase its 
own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch."149  Hence, it seems 
that the Court will tolerate congressional restriction of executive discretion 
as long as the stripped discretion is not subsumed by Congress.150 
146. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)–(c) (hinging the Attorney General’s obligation to 
apply for the appointment of an independent counsel upon a determination of whether there 
exist "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted"), with SIGTARP 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121 (predicating the Treasury Secretary’s obligation 
to take action with respect to a TARP-related deficiency as identified by SIGTARP upon an 
implicit determination of whether action is "necessary or appropriate"). 
147. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1). 
148. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). Rather, the Court concluded only 
that the Attorney General "has no duty to comply with the request [for the appointment of an 
independent counsel]." Id. The Court did not deny that the executive had a duty to comply 
with a request if there existed reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation was 
warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1). 
149. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694; see also Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A 
Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 351 (1989) 
(observing that Morrison stands for the proposition that "separation of powers challenges 
based on attempts by one branch to encroach on another’s functions should be reviewed 
much more stringently than attempts by one branch to take away the power of one branch 
but not draw it to itself"). 
150. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 ("We observe first that this case does not involve an 
attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch."). 
The Court noted that the statute in Morrison did not pose the danger of "congressional 
usurpation of Executive Branch functions" as did a statute in Bowsher. Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (offering an 
overview of the Court’s decision in Bowsher). In Bowsher, the statute at issue required the 
President to implement budgetary cuts exactly in accordance with the report of an officer 
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Therefore, although EESA’s certification provision appears to restrict 
executive discretion by obliging the Secretary to take action with respect to 
a SIGTARP recommendation when such action is either necessary or 
appropriate, this congressional restriction on executive discretion will likely 
pass constitutional muster, pursuant to Morrison, as long as the lost 
discretion is not absorbed by Congress.151  The stripped executive discretion 
at issue here is the discretion to execute EESA and to administer TARP 
according to the President’s own judgment.152  The Treasury Secretary’s 
ability to exercise his discretion in expending executive resources in 
managing TARP is hampered by the statutory construction advocated 
above.153  Hence, the issue now concerns the entity that has absorbed the 
discretion removed from the executive by Congress. By decree of EESA, 
SIGTARP has subsumed this executive discretion.154  Therefore, the inquiry 
necessarily becomes whether Congress controls SIGTARP and, thus, 
whether Congress, in violation of the separation of powers, is the entity that 
has implicitly absorbed the executive discretion that has been stripped from 
the executive by EESA. 
over whom Congress had retained the power to remove. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 718, 733 (1986) ("The President . . . must issue a[n] . . . order mandating the spending 
reductions specified by the Comptroller General . . . . Indeed, the Comptroller General 
commands the President himself to carry out, without the slightest variation . . . , the 
directive of the Comptroller General as to the budget reductions . . . ." (citing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 252(a)(3))); HALSTEAD, supra note 69, at 16 (noting that the report "by the Comptroller 
General would . . . be forwarded to the President who was required to issue an order 
enforcing the spending reductions"). The Court’s decision in Bowsher seems to stand for the 
proposition that, although Congress may restrict executive discretion, this stripped discretion 
may not, in turn, be absorbed by Congress into its own vortex. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 
(James Madison), supra note 27, at 343 (observing that the legislative branch has a tendency 
to "extend[] the sphere of its activity, and draw[] all power into its impetuous vortex"). 
151. Supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing how EESA could be construed to limit 
executive discretion through mandating the Secretary’s compliance with SIGTARP 
recommendations that are either necessary or appropriate). 
153. Supra Part III.B.2.b. 
154. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(2)–(3) (providing that an IG possesses the duty 
to "review . . . legislation and regulations relating to . . . such establishment and to make 
[related] recommendations . . . [and] to recommend policies for . . . [the] activities [of] such 
establishment" in order to promote economy and efficiency and in order to prevent and to 
detect fraud or abuse). In response to these deficiencies presented to the executive by 
SIGTARP, the Secretary must either take action to address them or certify to Congress that 
no action is necessary or appropriate. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f)(2), 
§ 121. Hence, SIGTARP in essence possesses the discretion to direct execution of EESA 
through recommending to the Secretary TARP-related action that is either necessary or 
appropriate and, thus, action that the Secretary may not refuse to undertake pursuant to the 
statute. 
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c. SIGTARP’s Independence from the Executive Branch 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the power to remove equates to the 
power to control.155  Hence, because the executive branch retains removal 
power over SIGTARP,156  cursory reflection suggests that Congress has not 
absorbed the discretion that is stripped from the executive by means of 
EESA’s certification provision.157  Pursuant to this perfunctory analysis, the 
dynamic between SIGTARP and the executive branch (created by EESA’s 
certification provision) does not transgress the separation of powers 
principle. 
However, the above analysis fails to appreciate the subtlety of the 
issue with respect to which entity controls SIGTARP—in essence, this 
issue comes "clad . . . in sheep’s clothing."158  The unusual independence 
from executive supervision with which SIGTARP operates, coupled with 
the loyalty to Congress that characterizes SIGTARP’s station, strongly 
challenges the conclusion that Congress lacks control over SIGTARP. 
Hence, this issue warrants a more comprehensive examination. 
155. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986) ("Under the separation of powers 
established by the Framers of the Constitution, . . . Congress may not retain the power of 
removal over an officer performing executive functions. The congressional removal power 
created a ‘here-and-now subservience’ of the Comptroller General to Congress." (citations 
omitted)). The Court in Bowsher concluded that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the 
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by 
impeachment." Id. at 726. "To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer 
answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the 
execution of the laws." Id. "Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can 
remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the 
performance of his functions, obey." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
156. EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 5231(b)(4); see also IG Act § 3(b) ("An Inspector General may 
be removed from office by the President."). 
157. See supra Part III.B.2.b.(3) (querying whether Congress, in violation of the 
separation of powers, has retained control over SIGTARP and, thus, has subsumed the 
discretion stripped from the executive through EESA’s certification provision). 
158. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s 
clothing: the potential of the asserted principle to effect important change in the equilibrium 
of power is not immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive 
analysis."). 
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(1) SIGTARP’s Distinctive Independence from the Executive Branch 
The degree of independence from executive supervision with which 
SIGTARP functions distinguishes SIGTARP from all other IGs.159 
SIGTARP’s unprecedented independence from the executive branch is a 
significant factor, considering both that the executive exercises only 
"nominal" supervisory authority over all other IGs in the first place160  and 
that IGs are already supposed to operate with an "unusual" degree of 
independence from the executive branch.161  All other IGs, pursuant to the 
IG Act, must submit reports to their respective agency head, yield to the 
general supervision of the agency head, and keep that agency head fully and 
currently informed.162  Furthermore, although an agency head may not alter 
159. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (observing that the accountability 
relationship between SIGTARP and the executive branch is unique among all other IGs). 
160. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Wash., D.C. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 
25 F.3d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 1994) (referring to the supervisory authority exercised by agency 
heads over IGs as "nominal"). In this case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the independence of 
IGs from the executive branch by declining to interpret a statute in a manner that would have 
"impinge[d] on the statutory independence of the [specific IG at issue in the case]." Id. at 
234; see id. at 235 ("[W]e would indirectly be authorizing the parties to collective bargaining 
to compromise, limit, and interfere with the independent status of the [IG] under the [IG 
Act]."). 
161. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 9 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 
2684 ("[Congress] wants [IGs] of high ability, stature and an unusual degree of 
independence—outsiders, at least to the extent that they will have no vested interest in the 
programs and policies whose economy, efficiency and effectiveness they are evaluating."). 
In fact, Congress intended for IGs to function with such independence from the executive 
branch that the IG Act originally was referred to the Senate as "the bill to reorganize the 
executive branch of the Government." Id. at 1. During the time of the congressional debates 
preceding passage of the IG Act, various governmental officials expressed concern that IGs 
"would not be clearly accountable to anyone in the executive branch." Gates & Knowles, 
supra note 53, at 485. Furthermore, since the passage of the IG Act, others have expressed 
dismay with respect to IGs’ increasingly enhanced independence. See MILLER CTR. OF 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 5 ("The fundamental problem is that no one watches the 
watchdogs. There is no central agency that collects information about what each [IG] is 
doing . . . . The IGs, born independent by design, are now so independent that some have 
begun to run amok. They constantly seek more authority . . . ."). 
162. Supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. Although an agency head wields 
"general" supervisory power over an IG, Congress intended that no other agency official 
would exercise supervisory authority over an IG. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7 ("The [IG] 
would be under the general supervision of the head of the agency or his deputy, but not 
under the supervision of any other official in the agency."). However, as discussed above, 
even the "general" supervisory authority possessed by the agency head amounts to only 
"nominal" efficacy. Supra note 160 and accompanying text. Congress did not intend for the 
agency head to be able to "prevent the [IG] from initiating and completing audits and 
investigations he believes necessary." S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7; see also id. at 26 ("If the 
head of an establishment asked the [IG] not to undertake a certain audit or investigation or to 
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the periodical reports that IGs must submit to Congress, an agency head 
may comment on those reports.163 
Despite the "unique"164  independence that all other IGs already enjoy 
within the executive branch, SIGTARP stretches this independence yet 
further. While EESA explicitly requires that SIGTARP submit reports to 
Congress, EESA does not explicitly require that SIGTARP report to or be 
supervised by an agency head.165  Furthermore, EESA makes no explicit 
allowance for the Treasury Secretary to comment on the reports that 
SIGTARP prepares for Congress.166  EESA’s failure to provide explicitly 
for these accountability arrangements stands in bold contrast to the 
requirements imposed upon all other IGs by the IG Act.167  In fact, 
subjecting SIGTARP to even the slightest degree of Treasury supervision 
seems to cut against both the language of EESA and congressional intent.168 
discontinue a certain audit or investigation, the [IG] would have the authority to refuse the 
request and to carry out his work."). In fact, Congress subjected IGs to the general 
supervision of agency heads only to foster a "smooth working relationship with the 
department head." Id. 
163. Supra note 57. 
164. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 31 ("[Congress] intends to confer upon the [IG] a 
unique status within the executive branch."). 
165. Supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
166. Supra note 57. 
167. See supra note 57 (discussing the confusion spawned by the ambiguity between 
EESA and the IG Act with respect to SIGTARP’s relationship with the executive branch). 
168. See Letter from Neil M. Barofsky to Bernard Knight, Jr., supra note 62, at 1 
("SIGTARP believes that [EESA] provides that SIGTARP is an independent entity within 
Treasury[] [and] that SIGTARP is not subject to the Secretary’s supervision . . . ."). In his 
letter, Barofsky noted that, by expressly depositing SIGIR and SIGAR under the supervision 
of their respective agency heads, Congress "demonstrated its ability to assign supervisory 
authority to [IGs], . . . when it intends to do so." Id. at 2–3. Barofsky continued by 
asserting, "Given that Congress knows how to assign supervisory duties, the omission of this 
language in EESA signifies its clear intention to preserve SIGTARP’s independence and not 
subject us to the Secretary’s [supervision]." Id. at 3; see also Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 
(observing that Treasury’s claim of supervisory authority over SIGTARP "seems contrary to 
Congress’s intent to charge SIGTARP with responsibility for aggressively guarding the 
TARP program from fraud and abuse . . . . [A] lack of independence from Treasury could 
tarnish the perception that SIGTARP has the ability to do its job effectively"). Furthermore, 
Barofksy stated, Congress incorporated into EESA only specific, enumerated provisions of 
the IG Act and established SIGTARP not "within the IG Act[,] [but] placed us within 
[another] chapter . . . of the United States Code." Letter from Neil M. Barofsky to Bernard 
Knight, Jr., supra note 62, at 3. Barofsky then cited the statement of Senator Max Baucus, 
the "legislative architect" of the EESA section that created SIGTARP: "I designed the office 
of this [IG] to be truly Independent . . . ." Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(2) The Tense Relationship Between SIGTARP and Treasury 
SIGTARP’s unparalleled independence from the executive branch is 
aggrandized by the tension that naturally characterizes the relationship 
between an IG and its respective agency head.169  Congress inserts IGs into 
executive agencies to operate as "[c]ongressional ferrets"170  whose prime 
role is to expose corruption and abuse within the executive branch.171  In 
performing this function, IGs exercise complete discretion in pursuing 
audits and investigations,172  enjoy unrestricted access to executive 
documents and materials,173  and wield the pungent subpoena power.174  A 
169. See S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 9 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 
2684 ("[Congress] does not doubt that some tension can result from th[e] relationship 
[between an agency head and an IG] . . . ."). Congress noted "a natural tendency for an 
agency administrator to be protective of the programs that he administers. In some cases, 
frank recognition of waste, mismanagement or wrongdoing reflects on him personally." Id. 
at 7. "Even if he is not personally implicated, revelations of wrongdoing or waste may 
reflect adversely on his programs and undercut public and congressional support for them. 
Under these circumstances, it is a fact that agency . . . supervisors in the executive branch do 
not always identify or come forward with evidence of failings in the programs they 
administer." Id. For this reason, Congress asserted, "the audit and investigative functions 
should be assigned to an individual whose independence is clear." Id. However, Congress 
acknowledged concerns "that the [IG] may become an adversary of the agency head and 
undermine his ability to run the agency." Id. at 9. 
170. See MILLER CTR. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 4 ("IGs . . . serve as 
members of the Executive Branch yet report to Congress about the internal workings of their 
agencies. They serve, in other words, within executive agencies as Congressional ferrets of 
dubious constitutionality . . . ."). 
171. See IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 2(2)(B) (establishing IGs to "prevent and detect fraud 
and abuse" in executive agencies). 
172. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 9 ("[M]ost IGs have virtually unfettered discretion 
over initiating and conducting audits and investigations dealing with waste, fraud, and abuse 
within their own agencies. As a corollary, they may accept, delay, modify, or reject a 
request to conduct an audit or investigation from any party . . . ."); supra note 162 (observing 
that an IG possesses the authority to rebuff a request from an agency head not to perform an 
audit or an investigation). 
173. See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 111, at 17 (expressing concern with 
respect to IGs’ "unrestricted access to executive branch materials and information"); see also 
EESA, 12 U.S.C. § 121(e)(4)(A) ("Upon request of [SIGTARP] for information or 
assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head 
of such entity shall, insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, 
furnish such information or assistance to [SIGTARP] . . . ."); IG Act § 6(a)–(b) (establishing 
IGs’ authority to "have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to 
programs and operations with respect to which that [IG] has responsibilities"). 
174. See EESA § 121(d)(1) (providing that SIGTARP "shall have the authorities 
provided in Section 6 of the [IG Act]"); IG Act § 6(a)(4) (providing that each IG is 
authorized "to require by subpena [sic] the production of all information, documents, reports, 
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resourceful IG that burrows tenaciously through an executive agency in 
search of evidence of fraud or abuse will likely aggravate an agency head, 
sparking the internal tension of which Congress spoke.175  However, the 
friction between SIGTARP and the Treasury Secretary appears to rival the 
level of tension that customarily defines the relationship between an IG and 
an agency head. Apart from the public showdown between SIGTARP and 
the Secretary with respect to Treasury’s supervisory authority over 
SIGTARP,176  Barofsky continues to assert his "aggressive posture" in 
discharging his responsibilities.177  Barofsky’s unyielding fidelity in 
tracking Treasury’s management of TARP’s mega-taxpayer fund surely 
will kindle additional discomfort in the Treasury Secretary against 
SIGTARP as the Secretary’s every move is thrust under the microscope of 
public scrutiny.178 
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in 
the performance of the functions assigned [to each IG], which subpena [sic], . . . shall be 
enforceable by . . . any . . . United States district court"). 
175. Supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (recounting the 2009 faceoff 
between SIGTARP and the Secretary with respect to Treasury’s supervisory authority over 
SIGTARP). 
177. See Perez & Solomon, supra note 62 ("Barofsky has gained a reputation for his 
aggressive posture and demands for information from government officials and Wall 
Street."); see also AIG Investigator: Where the Billions Went, CNBC, Jan. 26, 2010, 
http://m.cnbc.com/us_news/35076141  (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) ("Barofsky is setting off 
fireworks on Capitol Hill as he quietly and methodically pieces together the most complete 
historical record yet of the financial bailout. His reports are careful but not cautious, 
showing a willingness to stand up to some of the most powerful people and institutions in 
Washington . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
"There are, in fact, several other panels charged with reviewing and monitoring the 
bailout. But Mr. Barofsky is the only one backed by federal agents who carry guns and 
badges and, if necessary, can break the locks off file cabinets." Id. "Those added powers, 
and an attitude honed during . . . years of fighting white-collar criminals and Colombian 
drug lords as [a federal prosecutor]—he still has the knife from a foiled attempt on his life in 
a field outside Bogota—are propelling . . . Barofsky over barriers that have slowed the 
others." Id. 
In SIGTARP’s most current quarterly report, Barofsky boldly announces the 
deficiencies with respect to Treasury’s recent management of TARP, declaring that, "even if 
TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful 
reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car." 
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (Jan. 30, 2010), available at http://www. 
sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/January2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.  
178. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,850 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis 
Moore) (referring to Congress’s creation of TARP and posing the question, "What did the 
American people get or what can they expect to get from the $700 billion rescue plan?"). 
Legislative history indicates that Congress invented SIGTARP "to make sure that the 
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(3) SIGTARP’s Loyalty to Congress 
These twin issues—the extreme independence from the executive 
branch and the elevated tension with the Treasury Secretary—that typify 
SIGTARP’s relationship with the executive branch combine to produce the 
appearance that SIGTARP is steadily pulling away from the executive 
branch. In contrast to this uneasy association, EESA structures a 
relationship between SIGTARP and Congress that is characterized by 
mutual loyalty. The potential for congressional loyalty has sparked debate 
with respect to the constitutionality of IGs since the inception of the IG 
Act.179  An IG essentially serves as an extension of Congress’s oversight 
arm within executive agencies,180  seeking to ascertain whether "funds are 
being spent in accordance with the mandate and will of Congress."181  In 
addition both to reporting directly to Congress and to keeping Congress 
fully and currently informed, an IG is "the only executive branch 
Presidential appointee who speaks directly to Congress without clearance 
from the Office of Management and Budget."182  Furthermore, Congress 
taxpayers receive meaningful answers to these questions [and] to make certain that the 
money is spent wisely and to ensure that waste, fraud and mismanagement is avoided." Id. 
179. See 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 111, at 17 ("An even more serious 
problem is raised, in our opinion, by the provisions that make the [IGs] subject to divided 
and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches, in violation 
of the doctrine of separation of powers."). Congress acknowledged that, "[f]ocusing on the 
special responsibilities to report to Congress, some critics have argued that the [IG] will be 
serving two masters, making the position untenable." S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 9 (1978), as 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 2684. The Department of Justice underscored this 
issue by asserting that 
the [IG]’s obligation to keep Congress fully and currently informed, taken with 
the mandatory requirement that he provide any additional information or 
documents requested by Congress, and the condition that his reports be 
transmitted to Congress without executive branch clearance or approval, is 
inconsistent with his status as an officer in the executive branch, reporting to and 
under the general supervision of the head of the agency. 
1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 111, at 17. 
180. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 9 ("IGs are intended to serve as an oversight arm 
of Congress within agencies . . . ."). 
181. Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 484 (footnote and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
182. Id. at 475. "This ability to speak directly to Congress provides a potential source 
of substantial clout for an active inspector general." Id.; see also Hartmus, supra note 57, at 
249 ("[T]his ability to speak directly to Congress protects the independence of the IG and is 
a source of significant power."). 
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possesses the power to request IGs to acquire specific executive 
information.183 
Perhaps Congress encapsulated the issue best when it stated that IGs 
were fashioned by Congress in such a way that their "responsibility runs 
directly to the agency head and ultimately to the Congress."184  SIGTARP 
recently demonstrated this innate allegiance to Congress when, after 
Treasury asserted supervisory authority over SIGTARP, SIGTARP 
threatened to inform Congress if Treasury interfered with SIGTARP’s 
independence.185 
d. Whether the Combination of Executive Independence and Congressional 
Control over SIGTARP Violates the Separation of Powers 
This analysis with respect to SIGTARP’s independence from the 
executive branch reveals that Congress wields a substantial measure of 
control over SIGTARP. Ultimately, SIGTARP’s supposed "independence" 
from the executive amounts, in reality, not to independence from the 
executive, but to loyalty to Congress.186  More freedom from the executive 
branch results merely in more control by Congress.187  Despite the fact that 
183. See BURROWS, supra note 46, at 9 ("The legislative history of the IG Act supports 
the understanding that Congress could ask IGs for information." (citing 124 CONG. REC. 
32,032 (1978))). However, ambiguity pervades the congressional history with respect to this 
point. Compare 124 CONG. REC. 32,032 (1978) ("[T]here is no prohibition [in the IG Act] 
with respect to filing [with congressional committees] all the information which Congress 
wants. We will be able to get it. There is no problem about it."), with S. REP. NO. 95-1071, 
at 9–10 (stating that deletion from the final version of the IG Act of an express provision 
requiring IGs to provide executive information to Congress upon request should allay fears 
that "the [IG] could be used as a conduit of sensitive executive branch materials to 
Congress"). But see id. at 28 ("The relevant committees and subcommittees of Congress 
will undoubtedly be calling the [IG] to testify about the issues within his domain."). 
184. S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 7. 
185. See Dugan & Rose, supra note 40 ("SIGTARP has asserted that ‘should Treasury 
take actions that would impede our ability to independently conduct audits and 
investigations, we would report such interference to Congress without delay.’"). 
186. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 83 (1994) ("[Agency] [i]ndependence [from presidential authority], in 
short, might be a way of increasing legislative power over agencies." (citing Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 115 
(1994))). 
187. See id. ("[Agency] independence can be understood as a form of [congressional] 
aggrandizement. 	Congress might make agencies independent not to create real 
independence, but in order to diminish presidential authority over their operations precisely 
in the interest of subjecting those agencies to the control of congressional committees." 
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independence from the executive results in congressional aggrandizement, 
the Court nonetheless has upheld the constitutionality of executive officials’ 
independence from the executive.188 
However, the Court’s willingness to uphold executive officials’ 
independence from the executive branch is not boundless. In Bowsher, 
Congress retained the removal power over an independent officer who 
exercised executive power.189  The Court determined that this arrangement 
violated the separation of powers because Congress essentially controlled 
the exercise of executive power.190  In contrast, Congress retained no 
removal power over the independent officer in Morrison who exercised 
executive power.191  The Court concluded that, although the statute 
restricted the President’s removal power over the officer, Congress neither 
absorbed that stripped executive discretion nor controlled the exercise of 
the executive power at issue.192  The question therefore becomes whether 
(citing Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 186, at 115)). "[T]here are no ‘independent’ 
government actors in Washington, D.C." Id. at 83–84 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 
(1994)). "There are only actors influenced by the President, actors influenced by the 
Congress and its committee shadow governments, and actors who are tugged one way or the 
other. Anything that weakens the presidential set of incentives and controls strengthens 
Congress and vice versa." Id. at 84. "There is no such thing as a truly independent agency 
in Washington, D.C." Id. (citing Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 
99 DUKE L.J. 215 (1988)). 
188. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1173 (1992) ("Current constitutional 
case law allows Congress to vest core executive power in officers and agencies 
‘independent’ of the President . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250 (2001) ("Accepted constitutional doctrine 
holds that Congress possesses broad, although not unlimited, power to structure the 
relationship between the President and the administration, even to the extent of creating 
independent agencies, whose heads have substantial protection from presidential removal."); 
see also Calabresi, supra note 186, at 32–33 (noting the argument that "Congress has used 
its power to structure the cabinet departments and agencies in ways that make it very 
difficult for the President to oversee and control them, most especially by making certain 
officers independent and removal only ‘for cause.’"). 
189. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986). 
190. See id. at 726 ("To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer 
answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the 
execution of the laws."). 
191. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("[W]ith the exception of the 
power of impeachment—which applies to all officers of the United States—Congress 
retained for itself no powers of control or supervision over an independent counsel . . . . 
Congress’ [sic] role . . . is limited to receiving reports or other information and oversight of 
the independent counsel’s activities . . . ."). 
192. Id. 
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the issue presented by SIGTARP’s independence from the executive branch 
is more analogous to the issue confronted by the Court in Bowsher or in 
Morrison.193 
The fact that Congress has retained no role in SIGTARP’s removal, 
but instead has allocated to the President the removal power, suggests 
categorizing this issue into the Morrison class.194 	However, 
notwithstanding Congress’s relinquishment of the removal power, Congress 
has fashioned SIGTARP’s relationship with the executive branch in such a 
manner that SIGTARP is independent from the executive in virtually every 
other aspect. SIGTARP reports only to Congress,195  transmits to Congress 
TARP-related reports that are immune from executive comment,196  enjoys 
essentially unrestricted access to all executive branch documents,197 
responds to congressional requests to testify and to produce information 
with respect to Treasury’s management of TARP,198  serves as the only 
presidentially appointed executive official who speaks directly to Congress 
without executive permission,199  and functions impervious to executive 
supervision.200  SIGTARP’s strained relationship with the Treasury 
Secretary,201  and its status as a mere cog in the machine of congressional 
oversight of executive agencies,202  amplify the constitutional issues 
193. Although the Court’s decisions on separation of powers issues exceed its decisions 
in Bowsher and Morrison, these additional decisions need not be examined for purposes of 
this precise analysis. Most specifically, the Court in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602 (1935), decided only that "illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the 
President in respect of [quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial] officers." Id. at 629; see id. ("The 
authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require 
them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be 
doubted . . . ."). Furthermore, the Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), held 
that a law that subordinated to congressional approval the President’s power to remove an 
executive official violated the separation of powers. Id. at 176; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 
687 n.24 (stating that "the only issue actually decided in Myers was that ‘the President had 
power to remove a post-master of the first class, without the advice and consent of the 
Senate as required by an act of Congress’" (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626)). 
194. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that the President possesses the 
power to remove IGs from office). 
195. Supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
196. Supra note 57. 
197. Supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
198. Supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
199. Supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
200. Supra notes 165, 167–68 and accompanying text. 
201. Supra Part III.B.2.c.(2). 
202. Supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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surrounding SIGTARP’s independence from the executive branch and its 
close connection to Congress. 
Hence, the issue becomes whether congressional assignment to the 
President of the removal power over SIGTARP transmutes what would 
otherwise be a Bowsher situation into a Morrison situation. In other words, 
the inquiry is whether removal power is dispositive in determining the level 
of congressional control over the execution of the laws that qualifies as a 
violation of the separation of powers principle under Bowsher.203  Perhaps 
Congress contemplated this very issue as it crafted the legislation that 
conceived SIGTARP. Based on the foregoing analysis, Congress might 
have relinquished to the executive branch the removal power over 
SIGTARP in an attempt to comply facially with Bowsher,204  while 
concomitantly retaining virtually all remaining control over SIGTARP in an 
attempt to direct subtly the execution of EESA and its massive TARP 
fund.205  If, as argued above, the Treasury Secretary must take action with 
respect to TARP-related deficiencies identified by SIGTARP that are either 
necessary or appropriate,206  and if Congress possesses all control, except for 
removal power, over SIGTARP, then SIGTARP’s capacity to compel 
executive action with respect to TARP borders on congressional execution 
of EESA. 
It is plausible, if not likely, that SIGTARP is susceptible to 
congressional influence based both on SIGTARP’s independence from and 
tense relationship with the executive branch207  and on SIGTARP’s loyalty 
203. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 186, at 32–33 (noting the argument that Congress 
employs its power "to structure . . . agencies in ways that make it very difficult for the 
President to oversee and control them, most especially by making certain officers 
independent"). 
204. See supra note 78 (discussing the Court’s decision in Bowsher, in which the Court 
concluded that congressional retention of the removal power over an executive official 
amounted to congressional control over the execution of the laws in violation of the 
separation of powers). 
205. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 188, at 1173 ("Congress’s power to vest 
executive functions in officers and agencies independent of the President allows it to bring 
executive functions under its own potential domination and control, or at least to remove 
them from the President’s domination and control."). "When Congress creates an 
independent counsel or an independent agency to exercise an executive function, it transfers 
executive power from the President, who is constitutionally independent of Congress and 
responsive to a different national electoral constituency, to officers who are not 
constitutionally independent of Congress." Id. 
206. See supra Part III.B.2.b (arguing that EESA’s certification provision mandates 
executive compliance with SIGTARP recommendations that are either necessary or 
appropriate). 
207. See supra Part III.B.2.c.(1)–(2) (examining SIGTARP’s independence from and 
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to and connection with Congress.208  Pursuant to this prospect, SIGTARP 
functions merely as a transmission belt on which Congress seeks to enforce 
its intent with respect to the manner in which EESA and its massive TARP 
fund are executed.209  Congress likely does not want to relinquish so easily 
its control over its historic TARP program.210 
If the President suspected congressional interference with Treasury’s 
execution of EESA, he easily could exercise his removal power and dismiss 
211 the individual serving at any given time as SIGTARP. While this is true, 
this fact does not alter the reality that the office endures. Even if the 
President removed and replaced SIGTARP dozens of times, the same 
susceptibility to congressional influence and control would exist with 
respect to the new appointee based on the unchanging relationship dynamic 
fashioned by EESA. 
This situation veers dangerously close to qualifying as a Bowsher 
issue. However, the Court in Morrison concluded that the President’s 
minimal control over the independent counsel was adequate such that 
Congress did not possess sufficient control over the independent executive 
212 officer to transmute the case into a Bowsher issue. 	The President’s 
tense relationship with the executive branch). 
208. See supra Part III.B.2.c.(3) (examining SIGTARP’s loyalty to and connection with 
Congress). SIGTARP’s vulnerability to congressional influence also stems from the fact 
that SIGTARP lacks the self-defense mechanisms enjoyed by the President. See Calabresi & 
Rhodes, supra note 188, at 1173 ("These [independent] officers, who may be called to 
account by congressional committees or powerful members of Congress in oversight or 
appropriations hearings, lack the weapons of self-defense that the Constitution gives to the 
President." (footnote omitted)). 
209. Cf. Kagan, supra note 188, at 2255 ("[Administrative] agencies . . . function as 
little more than transmission belts for implementing legislative directives."). 
210. See 155 CONG. REC. H3,849 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (statement of Rep. Erik 
Paulsen) (expressing Congress’s feeling that "it is critical that we have the most stringent 
oversight . . . possible" with respect to Treasury’s management of TARP funds); see id. 
(statement of Rep. Jackie Speier) (advocating for "aggressive and competent oversight" of 
Treasury’s expenditure of TARP funds). 
211. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that the President possesses the 
power to remove IGs from office). 
212. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) ("We observe . . . that this case 
does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the 
Executive Branch. Unlike some of our previous cases, most recently Bowsher v. Synar, this 
case simply does not pose a ‘dange[r] of congressional usurpation of 
Executive . . . functions.’" (citations omitted)). "This is not a case in which the power to 
remove an executive official has been completely stripped from the President, thus providing 
no means for the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws." Id. at 692. 
"Rather, because the independent counsel may be terminated for ‘good cause,’ the 
Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is 
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supervisory authority over the independent counsel amounted to the power 
to remove for cause (a more restrictive standard than the unlimited removal 
power enjoyed by the President over SIGTARP)213  and the power to define 
the independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.214  Apart from these 
dual sources of executive control, the independent counsel possessed "full 
power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and 
prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the 
Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of 
Justice."215  Furthermore, the same tension that characterizes the executive’s 
relationship with SIGTARP also afflicted the executive’s relationship with 
216 the independent counsel. 
Although Congress resigned the removal power over the independent 
counsel to the executive branch, Congress retained various other methods 
of oversight with respect to the counsel.217  The statute provided that the 
independent counsel "may" transmit to Congress periodical reports on the 
counsel’s activities.218  The statute mandated that the counsel inform 
competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with 
the provisions of the Act." Id. 
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2006) ("An independent counsel . . . may be removed 
from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the 
Attorney General and only for good cause, physical or mental disability, or any other 
condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties." 
(footnote omitted)). 
214. See id. §§ 592(d), 593(b) (providing that the Attorney General’s application to the 
special court for the appointment of an independent counsel "shall contain sufficient 
information to assist the [court] . . . in defining that independent counsel’s prosecutorial 
jurisdiction" and providing that the court "shall define that . . . jurisdiction" based upon the 
Attorney General’s application). 
215. Id. § 594(a). 
216. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Besides weakening the 
Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, it must also be obvious that the institution of the 
independent counsel enfeebles him more directly in his constant confrontations with 
Congress, by eroding his public support."). "Nothing is so politically effective as the ability 
to charge that one’s opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, naive, 
ineffective, but, in all probability, ‘crooks’ . . . . The statute’s highly visible procedures 
assure, moreover, that unlike most investigations these will be widely known and 
prominently displayed." Id. at 713–14. 
217. See id. at 664–65 (majority opinion) (listing the methods of congressional 
oversight pertaining to the independent counsel). "The ‘appropriate committees of the 
Congress’ are given oversight jurisdiction in regard to the official conduct of an independent 
counsel, and the counsel is required by the Act to cooperate with Congress in the exercise of 
this jurisdiction." Id. at 664 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1)). 
218. See id. ("An independent counsel may from time to time send Congress statements 
or reports on his or her activities." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2))). 
SIGTARP AND THE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CLASH 	 427 
Congress of "substantial and credible information which [the counsel] 
receives . . . that may constitute grounds for an impeachment."219  Apart 
from the power to request the Attorney General to apply for the 
appointment of an independent counsel, the Court in Morrison ultimately 
summarized Congress’s role under the statute as "limited to receiving 
reports or other information and oversight of the independent counsel’s 
activities, functions that we have recognized generally as being incidental 
to the legislative function of Congress."220 
It is clear from this overview of Morrison that the logistics of 
executive independence and congressional supervision are very similar 
between the independent counsel and SIGTARP.221  These similarities 
could guide the conclusion that SIGTARP’s separation of powers issue fits 
more neatly within the Morrison class, instead of within the Bowsher 
class.222  However, although the specifics with respect to the independence 
from the executive branch and the close supervisory relationship with 
Congress are similar between SIGTARP and the independent counsel, the 
functions served by and the ultimate effect of the executive powers wielded 
by the separate officers are substantially distinct. 
The independent counsel in Morrison exercised investigative, 
prosecutorial, and law enforcement power.223  In sharp contrast, SIGTARP 
possesses the power to recommend to the executive actions that, pursuant to 
the statutory interpretation advocated above, must be implemented if 
necessary or appropriate.224  SIGTARP possesses the power indirectly to 
dictate the execution of a statute, a power not exercised by the independent 
counsel in Morrison.225  In essence, SIGTARP may commandeer the whole 
219. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (2006). 
220. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 
U.S. 135, 174 (1927)). 
221. See supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing the specifics of SIGTARP’s independence 
from the executive and its close relationship with Congress). 
222. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text (discussing the distinguishing 
features between Bowsher and Morrison). 
223. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 662 (stating that independent counsel statute grants to 
the counsel "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and 
prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and 
any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a))). 
224. Supra Part III.B.2.b. 
225. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (observing that the independent 
counsel exercised investigative and prosecutorial authority, and not the power indirectly to 
execute a statute). The Court in Morrison explicitly stated that the independent counsel did 
not possess "any authority to formulate policy for the Government." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 
671. 
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executive machine to execute EESA according to SIGTARP’s 
recommendations. Hence, the critical distinction between the power 
wielded by SIGTARP and the power wielded by the independent counsel 
likely removes the SIGTARP separation of powers issue from the confines 
of the Morrison case.226  Moreover, SIGTARP’s ability to compel the 
executive branch to execute EESA pursuant to recommendations that are 
either necessary or appropriate, coupled with the fact that Congress 
possesses significant control, supervision, and influence over SIGTARP, 
likely conveys this case into the Bowsher realm.227 
Under Bowsher, Congress may not reserve for itself an active role in 
the execution of the laws.228  Congress’s transgression of this rule through 
the SIGTARP dynamic229  constitutes an impermissible interference with the 
executive’s constitutional right to take care that the laws be faithfully 
230 executed and, thus, a violation of the separation of powers principle. 
IV. Solving SIGTARP’s Separation of Powers Problem Through 
Compliance with Bowsher 
Pursuant to the above analysis, Supreme Court precedent applied to 
the separation of powers issue presented by the SIGTARP dynamic likely 
results in a finding that Congress has transgressed the separation of powers 
226. See supra notes 191–92 and accompany text (laying out the parameters of the 
Morrison decision). 
227. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (setting forth the parameters of the 
Bowsher decision). 
228. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s reasoning 
and holding in Bowsher). 
229. The fact that the Court might never entertain a constitutional challenge with 
respect to the SIGTARP dynamic does not render this analysis moot. See In re Chrysler 
LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that various citizen groups lacked 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Treasury Secretary’s decision, pursuant to 
EESA, to utilize TARP money to finance the sale of Chrysler’s assets); Texans Against 
Governmental Waste and Unconstitutional Governmental Conduct v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 619 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282 (2009) (concluding that a citizen group lacked both 
citizen and taxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality of Treasury’s distribution of 
TARP funds to automobile manufacturers pursuant to EESA). If a prerequisite to 
scrutinizing the constitutionality of congressional legislation is that a challenge against that 
legislation must wind up in court, then Congress essentially could shed all constitutional 
restraints and act unfettered by public scrutiny as long as no one possesses standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of that congressional action. 
230. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (finding that Congress may not 
"impermissibly interfere" with the President’s constitutional duty to execute the laws). 
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by reserving for itself an active role in the execution of EESA.231  The task 
now becomes fashioning a solution to this separation of powers violation. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has upheld congressionally 
232 imposed executive reporting requirements. 	The Court has also upheld 
congressional restriction of executive discretion as long as the stripped 
discretion is not subsumed by Congress.233  Hence, EESA’s imposition of 
executive accountability and EESA’s restriction of executive discretion 
234 with respect to managing TARP may survive Supreme Court review. 
However, a solution must defuse the problematic element of congressional 
235 usurpation of the stripped executive discretion. 
This congressional usurpation of executive discretion originates from 
two separate elements of the SIGTARP dynamic. First, Congress retains a 
high level of control over SIGTARP due to SIGTARP’s extreme 
236 independence from the executive branch. 	Second, Congress’s control 
over SIGTARP is exacerbated by the compulsory effect of EESA’s 
237 certification provision. Because EESA’s certification provision obligates 
Treasury to comply with SIGTARP recommendations that are either 
necessary or appropriate, Congress’s significant control over SIGTARP 
238 amounts, in reality, to congressional control over the execution of EESA. 
Hence, the solution to the SIGTARP separation of powers issue must 
neutralize each of these two problematic elements. 
231. Supra Part III.B.2.d. 
232. Supra Part III.B.2.a.(3). 
233. Supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra Parts III.B.2.a–b (examining EESA’s executive reporting requirement 
and EESA’s mandate that Treasury comply with SIGTARP recommendations that are either 
necessary or appropriate). 
235. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (stating that the Court will tolerate 
congressional restriction of executive discretion as long as the stripped discretion is not 
subsumed by Congress). 
236. See supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing SIGTARP’s extreme independence from the 
executive branch). 
237. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing the coercive language of EESA’s executive 
certification provision). 
238. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s 
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of 
congressional control over the execution of EESA). 
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A. Reducing Congress’s Control over SIGTARP 
The first prong of the solution must diminish Congress’s control over 
SIGTARP through increasing SIGTARP’s accountability to Treasury.239  All 
other IGs, by way of the IG Act, are subject to the general supervision of and 
must report directly to their respective agency heads.240  Furthermore, an 
agency head may comment on the reports that an IG submits to Congress.241  
However, SIGTARP evades these requirements through EESA’s failure to 
provide expressly for these elements.242  Hence, Congress should amend 
EESA to embrace these features of executive control. 
Specifically, Congress should expressly incorporate into EESA §§ 3(a), 
4(a), and 5 of the IG Act. This change will enhance Treasury’s supervisory 
authority over SIGTARP in several ways. First, § 3(a) of the IG Act 
mandates that each IG "shall report to and be under the general supervision of 
the head of the establishment involved."243  Besides merely integrating into 
EESA this section of the IG Act, Congress should expressly provide in EESA 
that SIGTARP functions as an entity within Treasury and that the Treasury 
Secretary serves as the agency head to whom SIGTARP is accountable.244 
Second, § 4(a) of the IG Act enumerates certain duties and responsibilities 
incumbent upon each IG, including the duty "to keep the head of such 
establishment . . . fully and currently informed, by means of the reports 
required by section 5."245  Third, as noted, § 5 specifies the content of the 
reports that IGs must submit both to Congress and to their respective agency 
heads.246  In addition to incorporating into EESA these three provisions from 
the IG Act, Congress should amend EESA to authorize the Treasury 
Secretary to comment on the reports that SIGTARP submits to Congress.247 
239. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (stating that increased 
independence from the executive amounts, in reality, to increased control by Congress). 
240. Supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
241. Supra note 57. 
242. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (noting the ambiguity in EESA with 
respect to SIGTARP’s accountability to Treasury). 
243. IG Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(a). 
244. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that the vagueness of EESA’s 
language leaves unclear whether SIGTARP actually belongs within the Treasury Department 
and whether the Treasury Secretary serves as SIGTARP’s agency head). 
245. IG Act § 4(a)(5). 
246. Id. § 5. 
247. See supra note 57 (observing that, with respect to all IGs except for SIGTARP, an 
agency head may comment on the periodical reports that IGs are required to submit to 
Congress). Allotting to the Treasury Secretary this power to comment on SIGTARP’s 
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Through integrating these features into EESA, the executive branch retains 
more control over SIGTARP, indirectly alleviating the sting of compulsion 
contemplated by EESA’s executive certification requirement.248 
B. Disarming the Compulsory Component of EESA’s Executive 
Certification Requirement 
Even with the above amendment, the specter of congressional control 
over the execution of EESA (by means of the certification provision) is not 
fully removed. As long as SIGTARP is still susceptible to a degree of 
congressional influence or control, Congress may endeavor to control the 
execution of EESA by exploiting SIGTARP’s capacity to bind the 
executive branch through TARP-related recommendations that are either 
necessary or appropriate.249  Hence, the compulsory component of EESA’s 
executive certification provision must be defused in order to square the 
SIGTARP dynamic with the separation of powers principle propounded by 
the Court in Bowsher.250 
As stated above, the problematic certification provision currently 
provides: "The [Treasury] Secretary shall . . . (1) take action to address 
deficiencies identified by a report or investigation of [SIGTARP] or other 
auditor engaged by the TARP; or (2) certify to appropriate committees of 
Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate."251  
To disarm this provision’s compulsory component, Congress should 
redraft the provision as follows: 
congressional reports seems only proper considering that Congress’s departure from this 
component with respect to SIGTARP constitutes a breach of the original compromise 
between the legislative and executive branches that resulted in the passage of the IG Act. 
See Gates & Knowles, supra note 53, at 502 ("The most important provisions of the 
compromise [between Congress and the President with respect to the passage of the IG Act] 
were to require that [IGs] report to Congress through the Secretary, who could not change 
the content of the report but who could respond to it . . . ."). 
248. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s 
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of 
congressional control over the execution of EESA). 
249. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s 
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of 
congressional control over the execution of EESA). 
250. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (encapsulating the Court’s holding 
in Bowsher, that Congress may not retain a role in the execution of its laws). 
251. SIGTARP Act, Pub. L. No. 111-15, sec. 4(2)(f), § 121. For a discussion of the 
compulsory element contemplated by the language of this provision, see supra Part III.B.2.b. 
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The Treasury Secretary shall (1) consider deficiencies identified by a 
report or investigation of SIGTARP or other auditor engaged by the 
TARP; and (2) certify to appropriate committees of Congress with 
respect to how the Secretary responds to such deficiencies. The 
Secretary’s certifications to Congress shall be made available to the 
public, subject to the requirements of other law or to other overriding 
concerns such as national security, within twenty-four hours after 
submission to Congress. 
This proffered amendment eliminates the either/or ultimatum252 
imposed upon the Secretary by the current provision and defuses the 
compulsory element that converts the current clause into a weapon of 
congressional control over Treasury’s execution of EESA.253  Pursuant to 
this proposal, the statute’s certification requirement would no longer require 
the Secretary to implement SIGTARP recommendations that are either 
necessary or appropriate. Hence, Congress would lack the teeth to control 
through SIGTARP the execution of EESA because SIGTARP no longer 
wields the power to dictate Treasury’s management of TARP. 
However, SIGTARP would continue to recommend TARP-related 
actions to the Secretary, who would remain obliged to consider these 
recommendations. Hence, this amendment satisfies Congress’s desire to 
bring TARP-related deficiencies to Treasury’s attention. Furthermore, 
Congress’s desire to remain informed with respect to how the executive 
branch manages the multi-billion-dollar TARP fund is also satisfied 
through the requirement that the Secretary certify to Congress with respect 
to how the Secretary responds to SIGTARP recommendations. 
The proposed amendment constitutes a workable254  solution that 
balances both executive and legislative concerns and that facilitates the 
SIGTARP dynamic’s compliance with Bowsher. With Treasury’s 
increased control over SIGTARP,255  and SIGTARP’s inability to dictate 
252. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (advancing the position that the 
accountability dynamic created by EESA’s certification provision might impose upon the 
Secretary a mild congressional threat in the form of an "either/or" dilemma, requiring the 
Secretary either to comply with SIGTARP’s recommendations or to justify to Congress his 
refusal to comply with SIGTARP’s recommendations). 
253. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s 
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of 
congressional control over the execution of EESA). 
254. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (accounting for how "practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 
workable government"). 
255. See supra Part IV.B (proposing an amendment to EESA that reduces Congress’s 
control over SIGTARP by subjecting SIGTARP to increased executive supervision). 
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any longer the execution of EESA through proffering necessary or 
appropriate recommendations,256  the proposed amendment divests Congress 
of its capacity to control indirectly the execution of EESA.257  Therefore, 
the change enables the SIGTARP dynamic to comply with Bowsher’s rule 
258 that Congress may not retain a role in the execution of its laws. 
C. Executive Accountability to the People with Respect to Treasury’s 
Responses to SIGTARP Recommendations 
As advanced above, the proposed amendment requires that Treasury’s 
259 certification to Congress be made available to the public. 	In contrast, 
EESA’s current certification provision embraces the notion of executive 
accountability to Congress.260  Although the Court has upheld executive 
reporting requirements and other forms of congressionally imposed tools of 
executive accountability,261  the Founders intended "[t]he people [to be] the 
only censors of their governors."262 
All governmental power in America’s republic emanates from the 
263 people, the sovereign entity. 	Because the people are the repository of all 
256. See supra Part IV.B (proposing an amendment to EESA that removes from the 
executive certification requirement the compulsory component that empowered SIGTARP to 
direct the execution of EESA through submitting TARP-related recommendations that are 
either necessary or appropriate). 
257. See supra notes 194–230 and accompanying text (arguing that EESA’s 
certification provision and Congress’s control over SIGTARP combine to produce a result of 
congressional control over the execution of EESA). 
258. See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text (summarizing Bowsher and its rule 
with respect to the separation of powers principle). 
259. See supra Part IV.B (setting forth the proposed amendment). 
260. See supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing how EESA compels executive accountability 
to Congress). 
261. See supra Part III.B.2.a.(3) (noting the Court’s record of upholding executive 
reporting requirements). 
262. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 575 (quoting 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 57 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 
722 (1986) ("[T]he President, under Article II, is responsible not to the Congress, but to the 
people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are exercised by the two Houses as 
representatives of the people." (citing U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4)). 
263. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 577 ("I consider the people who constitute a 
society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation." (quoting 3 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 227)); id. ("All authority belongs to the people." 
(quoting 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 190)); FISHER, supra 
note 1, at 1 ("To be worthy of the name, a constitution embodies a philosophy of 
government with sovereignty resting with the people, not with elected officials or judges."); 
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governmental power, the public officers selected by the people to 
administer the government are accountable only to the people for the 
discharge of their duties.264  The Founders intended the three branches of 
government to stand independent and to act for themselves, unfettered by 
accountability to the other branches.265 
In fact, some Founders believed that not even the Supreme Court was 
intended to possess the power to determine the constitutionality of actions 
or laws vis-à-vis the other branches.266  Instead, some Founders stated, the 
JAY A. PARRY ET AL., THE REAL GEORGE WASHINGTON 754 (1991) ("The power under the 
Constitution will always be in the people. It is entrusted for certain defined purposes, and 
for a certain limited period, to representatives of their own choosing; and whenever it is 
executed contrary to their interest, . . . their servants can, and undoubtedly will, be recalled." 
(quoting 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 311 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931– 
44))). 
264. See DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
RELIGION 262 (5th ed. 2008) ("All power residing originally in the people and being derived 
from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authority-  
whether Legislative, Executive, or Judicial—are their substitutes and agents and are at all 
times accountable to them." (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I, art. V)). 
265. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson as stating 
that the "Constitution intended that the three great branches of the government should be 
coordinate, and independent of each other. As to acts, therefore, which are to be done by 
either, it has given no control to another branch" (quoting 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 213)). The Constitution relaxes the independence of the three 
branches only through specifically enumerated checks and balances. See infra note 283 
(noting that the partial mixture of powers contemplated by the concept of checks and 
balances comports with the separation of powers doctrine only where this commingling of 
powers is specifically identified by the Constitution). 
266. See, e.g., ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson as 
stating that "nothing in the Constitution has given [judges] a right to decide [on the validity 
of a certain sedition law] for the executive, more than to the executive to decide for them. 
Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them" (quoting 
11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 50)). In a letter to Abigail 
Adams, Jefferson stated: 
The judges, believing the [sedition] law Constitutional, had a right to pass a 
sentence of fine and imprisonment, because the power was placed in their hands 
by the Constitution. But the executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, 
were bound to remit the execution of it, because that power has been confided to 
them by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its coordinate branches 
should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the 
right to decide which laws are Constitutional and what not, not only for 
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive 
also in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 
Id. 
Elsewhere, Jefferson declared that the Constitution "did not intend to give the 
judiciary . . . control over the executive . . . . I have long wished for a proper occasion to 
have the gratuitous opinion in Marbury v. Madison brought before the public, and 
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Constitution contemplates each branch interpreting the Constitution for 
itself, within its own sphere, and determining the constitutionality of its 
own actions.267  Who, then, checks the independent discretion exercised by 
each branch? The Founders intended for the people to fill this role. 
Thomas Jefferson stated: 
When the legislative or executive functionaries act unconstitutionally, 
they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The 
exemption of the judges from that is quite dangerous enough. I know no 
safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people 
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise 
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it 
from them but to inform their discretion by education. This is the true 
corrective of abuses of Constitutional power.268 
This great principle—the people as the protectors of the 
Constitution—serves as the foundation for the amendment’s provision that 
Treasury’s certifications to Congress be made available to the public.269  By 
imposing upon the executive branch accountability to the people (rather 
denounced as not law." Id. (quoting 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 
262, at 213). 
267. See id. at 498 ("My construction of the Constitution . . . is that each department is 
truly independent of the others, and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the 
meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action . . . ." (quoting 15 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 212)). Jefferson also declared: 
The question whether the judges are invested with exclusive authority to decide 
on the Constitutionality of a law has been heretofore a subject of consideration 
with me in the exercise of official duties. Certainly there is not a word in the 
Constitution which has given that power to them more than to the executive or 
legislative branches. Questions of property, of character, and of crime being 
ascribed to the judges through a definite course of legal proceeding, laws 
involving such questions belong, of course, to them; and as they decide on them 
ultimately and without appeal, they of course decide for themselves. The 
Constitutional validity of the law or laws again prescribing executive action, and 
to be administered by that branch ultimately and without appeal, the executive 
must decide for themselves also whether, under the Constitution, they are valid 
or not. So also as to laws governing the proceedings of the legislature, that body 
must judge for itself the Constitutionality of the law, and equally without appeal 
or control from its coordinate branches. And, in general, that branch which is to 
act ultimately and without appeal on any law is the rightful expositor of the 
validity of the law, uncontrolled by the opinions of the other coordinate 
authorities. 
Id. at 497–98 (quoting 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 517). 
268. Id. at 499 (quoting 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 
277); see also BARTON, supra note 264, at 282 (noting that "the people and their use of the 
ballot box was the check" upon abuses by the governmental branches). 
269. See supra Part IV.B (setting forth the proposed amendment). 
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than accountability to Congress) with respect to its execution of EESA, the 
amendment seeks to restore the people to their proper place as the "true 
corrective of abuses of Constitutional power."270  If the executive 
irrationally spurns SIGTARP’s recommendations under the amendment 
proposed above, it is the people who should rectify this choice. Congress’s 
unwillingness to relinquish control over its multi-billion dollar economic 
bailout program, though superficially justifiable, finds no sympathy in the 
Constitution’s separation of powers principle. Therefore, Congress’s 
misguided efforts to supervise the execution of EESA must bow to the 
separation of powers and to the people’s prerogative to ensure the proper 
execution of the laws. 
V. The People: A Principle for Preserving the Separation of Powers in 
Future Crises 
In addition merely to analyzing a specific legal issue and to offering 
proposals for change with respect to that isolated issue, this Note advances 
a principle for sustaining the separation of powers principle in an age of 
American history when historic financial and societal crises will likely elicit 
more bold legislative responses.271  Just as accountability to the people 
emerges as an element of the solution with respect to the SIGTARP issue, 
accountability to the people also applies within the context of the separation 
of powers principle. However, before describing the people’s central role 
in upholding this principle, we must first consider briefly the grave 
importance of preserving the separation of powers within this nation’s 
government. 
A. A Brief Examination into the Critical Importance of Preserving the 
Separation of Powers 
The separation of powers principle serves as the cornerstone of the 
United States’ constitutional form of government—a governmental formula 
that has triggered an age of freedom and of technological and societal 
advancement the likes of which no other government on earth has ever 
270. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 499 (quoting 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 277). 
271. See supra pp. 384–85 (stating the intention to advance a principle for preserving 
the separation of powers during future crises that may arise as a result of America’s 
uncertain future). 
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produced.272  A government that has engendered such coveted results 
establishes itself a model to be emulated and demands perpetuation.273  The 
separation of powers principle, as the foundational ingredient in America’s 
274 successful governmental formula, likewise necessitates perpetuation. 
272. See generally W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE FIVE THOUSAND YEAR LEAP: TWENTY-
EIGHT IDEAS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (Nat’l Ctr. for Constitutional Studies, 5th prtg. 
1987) (1981). "Colonies of civilized human beings have been emerging and disappearing on 
the continental fringes of the Planet Earth for over 5,000 years. Each of these ganglia of 
civilized mankind had similar aspirations, but none fulfilled them. At least, not in their 
fullest dimensions." Id. at 1. "Some built cities for over a million people that now lie buried 
in the skeletal debris of the Sahara sands." Id. "Others built cities that were even larger—in 
Asia and South America—but snakes, rodents, and entangled vines are about all that live 
today in the ghostly grandeur of their ruined past." Id. 
"One need not be an American citizen to feel a sense of genuine pride in the fantastic 
list of achievements which bubbled up from the massive melting pot of humanity that 
swarmed to the shores of this new land and contributed to its mighty leap in technical, 
political, and economic achievement." Id. at 3. "The spirit of freedom which moved out 
across the world in the 1800s was primarily inspired by the fruits of freedom in the United 
States." Id. "The climate of free-market economics allowed science to thrive in an 
explosion of inventions and technical discoveries which, in merely 200 years, gave the world 
the gigantic new power resources of harnessed electricity, the internal combustion engine, jet 
propulsion, exotic space vehicles, and all the wonders of nuclear energy." Id. 
"Communications were revolutionized, first by the telegraph, then the telephone, followed 
by radio and television. The whole earth was explored from pole to pole—even the depths 
of the sea." Id. "Then men left the earth in rocket ships and actually walked on the moon. 
They sent up a space plane that could be maneuvered and landed back on the earth." Id. 
"The average length of life was doubled; the quality of life was tremendously enhanced." Id. 
"Homes, food, textiles, communications, transportation, central heating, central cooling, 
world travel, millions of books, a high literacy rate, schools for everybody, surgical miracles, 
medical cures for age-old diseases, entertainment at the touch of a switch, and instant news, 
twenty-four hours a day. That was the story." Id. at 3–4. 
"Of course, all of this did not happen just in America, but it did flow out primarily from 
the swift current of freedom and prosperity which the American Founders turned loose into 
the spillways of human progress all over the world. In 200 years, the human race had made 
a 5,000-year leap." Id. at 4. 
273. See generally W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA (2d ed., rev. 1986) 
[hereinafter SKOUSEN, AMERICA]. "[T]here has been a need to review the history and 
development of the making of America in order to recapture the brilliant precepts which 
made Americans the first free people in modern times." Id. at ix. "It would be a disastrous 
loss to all humanity if these great principles were allowed to become neglected or lost." Id. 
274. See BARTON, supra note 264, at 278 (establishing the importance of "maintaining 
the separation of powers"); see also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 957–58 (1983) ("To preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, 
the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded."); Humphrey’s 
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The fundamental necessity of maintaining 
each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or 
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is 
hardly open to serious question."). Thomas Jefferson warned, "[T]o preserve the republican 
form and principles of our Constitution and [to] cleave to the salutary distribution of powers 
438 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375 (2011) 
To grasp the critical importance of protecting the separation of powers, 
we must first comprehend the Founders’ reasons for inculcating this 
principle into the constitutional government that they fashioned. The 
purpose of government is to secure to individuals their rights and freedoms 
such that these individuals are able lawfully to pursue life, liberty, and 
happiness unrestrained by the interference of others.275  Citizens surrender 
certain rights for the public good and entrust their leaders with the power 
both to protect their retained rights and to govern the affairs of the 
276 civilization in the way that best facilitates the pursuit of happiness. 
However, human nature is afflicted by the tendency to abuse power.277 
Hence, the allocation to mortals of the authority to govern must be 
accompanied by safeguards sufficiently potent to counteract the tendency of 
leaders to abuse their power and to oppress those over whom they 
preside.278 
which [the Constitution] has established . . . . are the two sheet anchors of our Union. If 
driven from either, we shall be in danger of foundering." BARTON, supra note 264, at 278 
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 4 MEMOIR, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES 375 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1830)). 
275. See generally EZRA TAFT BENSON, THE PROPER ROLE OF GOVERNMENT (1968). 
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. 
That, to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . ."); ALLISON ET AL., 
supra note 27, at 463 ("It is to secure our rights that we resort to government at all." (quoting 
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 4)); see also 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 108 (observing that "the happiness of society is the end of 
government" (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977))). "From 
this principle it will follow, that the form of government, which communicates ease, 
comfort, security, or in one word happiness to the greatest number of persons, and in the 
greatest degree, is the best." Id. (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra, at 86). 
276. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 
1967) (1690) ("[B]ecause no political Society can . . . subsist without having in itself the 
Power to preserve the Property . . . of all those of that Society, . . . there only is political 
Society where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, resigned it up into 
the Hands of the Community . . . ."). 
277. See 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 109, at 161 ("[C]onstant experience shows us that 
every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will 
go."); see also BARTON, supra note 264, at 277 ("It was the lesson of history that the 
tendency of human nature was to accrue and abuse power . . . ."). In his famed Farewell 
Address, George Washington noted "the love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which 
predominates in the human heart." PARRY ET AL., supra note 263, at 787 (quoting 35 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 263, at 228). 
278. PARRY ET AL., supra note 263, at 787 (recognizing, due to the tendency of those 
with power to abuse that power, the "necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of 
political power" (quoting 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 263, at 
228); see also 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 109, at 161 ("To prevent this abuse, it is 
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The Founders resolved that the three basic powers of government279 
must not unite in the hands of one entity, for a single entity possessing all 
three governmental powers would surely fall prey to the tendency to abuse 
that power, typifying the very definition of tyranny.280  To guard against 
power’s inclination to consolidate, the Founders undertook to structure a 
government in which the three distinct powers were separated.281  However, 
necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power."). William 
Grayson, a Revolutionary War officer and a Virginia lawyer, stated, "Power ought to have 
such checks and limitations as to prevent bad men from abusing it. It ought to be granted on 
a supposition that men will be bad; for it may be eventually so." See SKOUSEN, AMERICA, 
supra note 273, at 188 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 563 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901)); see also 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 314 (asserting the importance of "presuming the 
worst" and assuming "that men in Power may be unrighteous" (quoting 9 W.B. GWYN, THE 
MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN 
TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 131 (1965))). In a moving plea for 
the establishment of a government that defends against the human proclivity for abusing 
power, Thomas Jefferson declared: 
Nor should our assembly be deluded by the integrity of their own purposes, and 
conclude that these unlimited powers will never be abused, because themselves 
are not disposed to abuse them. They should look forward to a time, and that 
not a distant one, when corruption in this, as in the country from which we 
derive our origin, will have seized the heads of government, and be spread by 
them through the body of the people; when they will purchase the voices of the 
people, and make them pay the price. Human nature is the same on every side 
of the Atlantic, and will be alike influenced by the same causes. The time to 
guard against corruption and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold on 
us. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth 
and talons after he shall have entered. 
Id. at 320 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William 
Peden ed., 1954)). 
279. See 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 109, at 162–63 ("In every government there are 
three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive . . . ; and the . . . judiciary . . . ."). 
280. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 336 ("The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 375 (4th ed., 1891) ("In absolute governments the 
whole executive, legislative, and judicial powers are . . . exclusively confined to a single 
individual; and such a form of government is denominated a despotism . . . . If the same 
powers are exclusively confided to a few persons, . . . the government may be appropriately 
denominated a[] . . . despotic aristocracy."); see also BARTON, supra note 264, at 277 ("It 
was the lesson of history that . . . tyranny occurred whenever government power was 
consolidated in one branch."). 
281. See U.S. CONST., arts. I–III (allocating among the three separate branches the 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the federal government); 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 311 (observing that the remedy against "the kind of 
arbitrary, tyrannical rule against which the governed had to be protected" lay in a "separation 
440 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 375 (2011) 
the Framers recognized that mere parchment barriers as recorded in the 
Constitution were insufficient to maintain in practice the degree of 
separation that was necessary to combat tyranny.282  For this reason, the 
Founders instituted "auxiliary precautions" in the form of internal checks 
and balances to preserve the equilibrium of power among the three 
branches.283  
of [the three] governmental functions" (citing Max Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation of 
Powers in Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 842, 855–86 (1938))); see 
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("The men who met in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the 
separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny."). Thomas Jefferson stated: 
The concentrating these [three governmental powers] in the same hands is 
precisely the definition of despotic government . . . . An elective despotism was 
not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on 
free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and 
balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend 
their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. 
For this reason that convention, which passed the ordinance of government, laid 
its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive and judiciary 
departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise 
the powers of more than one of them at the same time. 
1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 319–20 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
JEFFERSON, supra note 278, at 120–21). 
282. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 347 ("[A] mere 
demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a 
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all 
the powers of government in the same hands."); see also 1 STORY, supra note 280, at 383 
(noting the inadequacy of mere parchment barriers in maintaining separation among the 
three branches of governmental power). Story observed: 
Power . . . is of an encroaching nature, and it ought to be effectually restrained 
from passing the limits assigned to it. Having separated the three great 
departments by a broad line from each other, the difficult task remains to 
provide some practical means for the security of each against the meditated or 
occasional invasions of the others. Is it sufficient to declare on parchment in the 
Constitution, that each shall remain, and neither shall usurp the functions of the 
other? No one, well read in history in general, or even in our own history during 
the period of the existence of our State constitutions, will place much reliance on 
such declarations. 
Id. 
283. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 356 (emphasizing 
the need for "auxiliary precautions" as internal controls on government); see also JOHN L. 
FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 27 (1986) ("The framers believed 
that if they could divide the national authority into three autonomous branches, . . . and if 
each of these branches possessed a particular function with built-in defenses and powers to 
prevent dominance by another branch, then these provisions, . . . would . . . prevent the . . . 
government from achieving ascendancy over its citizens." (citing A. VANDERBILT, THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 48 (1953))); 
1 STORY, supra note 280, at 384 ("[I]n order to preserve in full vigor the constitutional 
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barrier between each department, when they are entirely separated, it is obviously 
indispensable that each should possess equally, and in the same degree, the means of self-
protection."); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 188, at 1155–56 ("The genius of the American 
Constitution lies in its use of structural devices to preserve individual liberty . . . . By thus 
fragmenting and institutionalizing conflict [through checks and balances], the new political 
science of the eighteenth century sought to oblige a government by men and over men ‘to 
control itself.’" (emphasis omitted)). 
In an oft-quoted passage, James Madison penned: 
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in 
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all 
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with 
the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, 
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But 
what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. 
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 356. 
The drafters of the Constitution inserted these checks and balances by distributing to 
each department certain "negatives" over the other branches. See 1 STORY, supra note 280, 
at 381 (observing that the occasional mixture of powers contemplated by the scheme of 
checks and balances set forth in the Constitution involves only the "power of rejecting, 
rather than resolving, . . . [such that no branch] has . . . any power of doing wrong, but 
merely of preventing wrong from being done"). Naturally, then, the Constitution does not 
institute an absolute separation of powers among the three branches. See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 339 (looking to state constitutions and observing 
that "there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept 
absolutely separate and distinct . . . . [, due to the] impossibility and inexpediency of 
avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments"); id. NO. 48 (James Madison) at 343 
("[T]he political apothegm . . . does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
departments should be wholly unconnected . . . . [U]nless these departments be so far 
connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the [proper] 
degree of separation . . . can never in practice be duly maintained."); id. NO. 51 (James 
Madison) at 355 (asserting the importance of "so contriving the interior structure of the 
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
of keeping each other in their proper places"); id. at 356 ("[T]he great security against a 
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to 
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal 
motives to resist encroachments of the others."); see also SKOUSEN, AMERICA, supra note 
273, at 187–90 (discussing the practicality of checks and balances). 
Rather, the crux of the separation of powers principle lies in the proposition that "the 
powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely 
administered by either of the other departments." THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), 
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In short, governments are installed in societies to guarantee to 
individual citizens their basic rights.284  In order to secure to citizens their 
liberty, government must be apportioned the power that is necessary to 
function effectively.285  However, human nature suffers from the tendency 
to abuse power.286  Because government entails mortals governing mortals, 
government must be structured to neutralize the human predisposition to 
abuse power.287  The Founders grasped these important truths and crafted 
their government accordingly. The separation of powers and the system of 
checks and balances comprise the governmental structure implemented by 
the Framers for the purpose of counteracting the human tendency to abuse 
power such that individual liberty could be preserved.288 
Hence, because the purpose of America’s government is to secure to 
its citizens their rights, it is absolutely critical to preserve the internal 
structure designed by the Framers, or else governmental power will 
supra note 27, at 343; see also id. NO. 47 (James Madison) at 338 ("[W]here the whole 
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of 
another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."); id. at 
339–40 ("It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from 
exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is 
prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted."). 
However, this partial mixture of powers comports with the separation of powers 
doctrine only where such commingling of powers is specifically identified by the 
Constitution. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) ("[T]he reasonable 
construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be kept separate in all 
cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be expounded 
to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires." (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 497 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834))); ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 623 ("The principle of the 
Constitution is that of a separation of legislative, executive, and judiciary functions, except 
in cases specified." (quoting 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 108 
(emphasis added))). 
Some of the explicit checks and balances enumerated by the Constitution include the 
President’s legislative veto power, the Senate’s power over executive appointments, and the 
judiciary’s tenure in office during good behavior. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7 (allocating to the 
President the power to veto congressional legislation); id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (allotting to the 
Senate the power to affirm or to reject presidential appointments of lower executive 
officials); id., art. III, § 1 (providing that the judges of the Supreme Court shall hold their 
offices during good behavior); see also 1 STORY, supra note 280, at 390–91 (detailing the 
checks and balances itemized by the Constitution). The Constitution enumerates a total of 
seventeen checks between the three branches of government. SKOUSEN, AMERICA, supra 
note 273, at 188. 
284. Supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
285. Supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
286. Supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
287. Supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
288. Supra notes 278–83 and accompanying text. 
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centralize and the very government intended to protect freedom will be 
wielded in the hands of tyrants as a powerful weapon for the destruction of 
freedom.289  The parchment guarantees of the Constitution are meaningless 
if the governmental structure corrodes.290  The separation of powers as 
established by the Constitution must be preserved, not merely for 
separation’s sake, but for the sake of preserving for ourselves and for our 
posterity the liberty291  for which Americans have fought and died.292 
B. The People as the True Guardians of the Separation of Powers 
As our nation plunges into an era of economic uncertainty, Congress 
likely will respond to future crises by undertaking more bold, innovative 
293 legislation. 	Hasty legislative responses (such as Congress’s passage of 
EESA) to pressing national problems can disregard constitutional norms 
that would otherwise govern more deliberative legislative action.294 
289. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) ("The Framers recognized that, in 
the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving 
liberty."). 
290. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Without 
a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights would be worthless, as are the bills 
of rights of many nations of the world that have adopted, or even improved upon, the mere 
words of ours."). It is because "the mere words of a Bill of Rights are not self-effectuating," 
asserted Justice Scalia, that the separation of powers structure is the "central guarantee of a 
just Government." Id. at 697–98. 
291. See U.S. CONST., pmbl. (declaring that the Constitution is established to "secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"). 
292. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the 
separation and equilibration of powers in general, . . . was not merely to assure effective 
government but to preserve individual freedom."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) 
("The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the 
minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted in Philadelphia in 
the summer of 1787."). 
293. See supra notes 30–31, 33 and accompanying text (noting the likelihood both of 
future crises and future legislative experimentation in response to these crises). 
294. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 758–59 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how 
inventive congressional legislation in response to a "national budget crisis" violated the 
separation of powers); see also FISHER, supra note 1, at 292 (warning against "shortsighted 
reactions to immediate events and the failure to take into account the longer view"). 
The Court in Chadha recognized that the limitations imposed by the separation of 
powers upon the governmental branches likely would cause inconvenience and inhibit hasty 
responses. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The 
Court stated: 
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention 
impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, 
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However, even the most pressing national crises do not justify sacrificing 
the separation of powers principle.295  As the sovereign entity guarding 
America’s governmental structure,296  the people must ensure that the 
separation of powers is not "swept into the dustbin of repudiated 
constitutional principles."297  Although the Court has attempted to fill this 
role,298  this function belongs by right to the people.299 
America’s citizens must fulfill their duty as the guardians of America’s 
freedom experiment.300  This trust imposes upon the people an obligation to 
educate themselves concerning the separation of powers and other 
constitutional principles,301  enabling them to gauge the constitutionality of 
governmental action and to discern departures from constitutional norms so 
even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who 
had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts 
to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this 
Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered 
in complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by 
the Congress or by the President. With all the obvious flaws of delay, 
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to 
preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully 
crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
295. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 758–59 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
("Neither the unquestioned urgency of the national budget crisis nor the Comptroller 
General’s proud record of professionalism and dedication provides a justification [for 
violating the separation of powers]."); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944–45 ("[T]he fact that 
a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution . . . . [E]ven 
useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands of the Constitution . . . ."). For an 
examination of the critical importance of preserving the separation of powers principle, see 
supra Part V.A. 
296. See supra notes 263, 268 and accompanying text (explaining that the people are 
the repository of all power in America’s constitutional republic and that the duty to preserve 
this republic therefore devolves on the people). 
297. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
298. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (seizing the judicial 
review power). 
299. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (stating that the people serve as the 
"true corrective of abuses of Constitutional power"). 
300. See Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Speech at the Investiture of 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia at the White House 
(Sept. 26, 1986), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 97 (Steven G. Calabresi 
ed., 2007) ("[W]e the people are the ultimate defenders of freedom."). 
301. See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 27, at 578 ("[I]f we think [the people] not 
enlightened enough to exercise their control [over government] with a wholesome discretion, 
the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education." (quoting 
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 262, at 278)). 
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that they can quickly rectify these deviations through the political process.302 
It is the "people—not the courts—[who] must control the destiny of the 
nation."303 
Lawmakers and government officials must remember that they serve the 
people.304  They must confine their actions within the boundaries set by the 
Constitution, regardless of crises that present seemingly new problems. 
However, those who wield governmental power can fail to observe the 
limitations imposed upon them by the Constitution.305  As such, an entity 
detached from the fierce power struggle among the governmental branches 
must assume the role of ensuring that government observes the limits 
imposed by the separation of powers principle. 
The American people must unite in relearning the truths underlying the 
constitutional structure so that they are able to preserve the separation of 
powers through holding governmental leaders accountable for their actions 
based on the standard set forth by the Constitution, the supreme law of the 
land.306  President Ronald Reagan admonished: 
We the people created the government and gave it its powers. And our 
love of liberty and our spiritual strength, our dedication to the 
Constitution, are what, in the end, preserves our great nation and this great 
hope for all mankind. All of us, as Americans, are joined in the great 
common enterprise to write the story of freedom—the greatest adventure 
mankind has ever known and one we must pass on to our children and 
their children—remembering that freedom is never more than one 
generation away from extinction.307 
302. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (observing that the "true corrective of 
abuses of Constitutional power" requires the people to censor the government through the 
elective process). 
303. BARTON, supra note 264, at 284. 
304. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text (observing that the purpose of 
government is to secure to citizens their rights and to allocate to leaders the power to ensure 
that government fulfills its proper function). 
305. See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text (noting the tendency of human 
nature to grasp at power, necessitating the implementation of internal safeguards to 
counteract the predisposition of leaders to abuse their power and to oppress those over whom 
they preside). 
306. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 446, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) ("The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself . . . ."); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179–80 (1803) ("[I]t is apparent, that the framers of 
the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of 
the legislature . . . . [I]n declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself 
is first mentioned . . . ." (emphasis omitted)). 
307. Reagan, supra note 300, at 97. 
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In order for the separation of powers to weather the stormy seas ahead, it 
is the people who must rise to the occasion—this is the age-old principle that 
this Note advances as the surest safeguard against the deterioration of the 
separation of powers and of America’s republic. In the same speech, 
President Reagan declared: 
The warning, more than a century ago, attributed to Daniel Webster, 
remains as timeless as the document he revered. "Miracles do not 
cluster," he said, "Hold on to the Constitution of the United States of 
America and to the Republic for which it stands—what has happened 
once in 6,000 years may never happen again. Hold on to your 
Constitution, for if the American Constitution shall fall there will be 
anarchy throughout the world."308 
This Note echoes President Reagan’s words, sounding a call to the 
American people to "hold on to [their] Constitution" during the times of 
future crisis that might occasion hasty governmental innovation that 
disregards the separation of powers principle.309 
Upon exiting the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, a woman 
inquired of Benjamin Franklin, "Well Doctor what have we got a republic or 
a monarchy?" In his characteristic wisdom, Franklin responded, "A republic 
if you can keep it."310 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
